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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters on program evaluation, or the estimation of
treatment effects.
The first chapter discusses bootstrap methods for inference on matching estimators,
a popular approach to program evaluation. Abadie and Imbens (2008) showed that the
standard non-parametric bootstrap fails to provide valid inference with matching estimators,
and conjectured that a wild bootstrap could solve the problem. Otsu and Rai (2017)
confirmed this conjecture, providing a wild bootstrap procedure that is valid in general.
Their bootstrap builds in a bias correction procedure that requires estimation of conditional
mean functions, a procedure that is generally necessary for consistent matching estimation.
However, this step also introduces a new source of estimation error, lessening the efficiency
of the bootstrap. I show that even in a special case, when bias correction in the estimator
is unnecessary, the conditional mean function estimation is a required element of any wild
bootstrap for the matching estimator. This shows that the Otsu and Rai bootstrap cannot
be modified to be more efficient even by leveraging much stronger assumptions. Simulations
provide additional support for this conclusion.
The second chapter also deals with matching estimators. I consider the problem faced
by a practitioner who wishes to use matching estimation to estimate a treatment effect - in
particular, choosing from a large set of available matching procedures. I cast matching esti-
mators as two-step procedures - a weight-generation step followed by a weighted difference
in means - and derive weights that minimize mean-squared error (MSE) under certain con-
ditions. Understanding why the optimal weights behave the way they do generates insights
about which matching procedures are likely to minimize MSE, enabling practitioners to use
their economic intuition, knowledge of the empirical context, and knowledge of the sam-
viii
pling process to choose an appropriate matching procedure. I develop a simple ‘augmented’
matching procedure to illustrate, and through simulation confirm that the guidance I offer
is correct.
In the final chapter, I apply my program evaluation expertise to a question in the
economics of education - specifically, the effect of teacher gender on student test scores.
Previous literature in this vein has focused on the estimation of average effects. By exploit-
ing random assignment of students to teachers in a field experiment, I study heterogeneity
in the impact of teacher gender on math and reading test outcomes for primary school stu-
dents of differing ability. I find that assignment to a female teacher is generally positive for
male students, while it has no significant effect for female students. In addition, I find very
little heterogeneity in the effect of teacher gender along the ability axis, suggesting that
average effect estimates from previous investigations do not mask significant heterogeneity.
My results are consistent with differential teacher behavior based on gender stereotypes,
and somewhat inconsistent with differential student behavior based on gender stereotypes.
1
CHAPTER 1. A NOTE ON BOOTSTRAPS FOR MATCHING
ESTIMATION
Matching estimators are a popular approach to program evaluation. Abadie and Im-
bens (2008) showed that the naive bootstrap fails to provide valid inference with matching
estimators, and conjectured that a wild bootstrap could solve the problem. Otsu and Rai
(2017) confirm this conjecture. I show that even with much stronger assumptions, the Otsu
and Rai (2017) bootstrap cannot be modified to be more efficient.
1.1 Introduction
Evaluating the efficacy of programs or treatments requires the estimation of treatment
effects. A popular nonparametric method for estimating average treatment effects is the
method of matching, which has significant intuitive appeal. These methods match treated
units to control units that are ‘close’ as measured by a chosen metric. The estimated average
treatment effect is then constructed by averaging the differences between matched units.
Matching can be done with or without replacement, but the latter is more common.
Abadie and Imbens (2006) began a comprehensive study of matching estimators, continued
in a series of papers (Abadie and Imbens, 2008, 2011, 2009, 2016). Abadie and Imbens
(2006) found that matching on covariates is not always
√
N -consistent, generally requiring
a bias correction. Abadie and Imbens (2008) showed that even when the matching estimator
is
√
N -consistent, the ‘naive’ bootstrap1 fails to correctly estimate the distribution of the
matching estimator.
1Resampling observations with replacement to create a bootstrapped sample.
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Abadie and Imbens (2008) traced the failure of the naive bootstrap to a failure to
capture the behavior of the matching process that underlies the estimator. Specifically, a
given control observation will tend not to be matched to the same treated units, or even
the same number of treated units, across the true and bootstrapped samples. Abadie and
Imbens (2008) noted that this reasoning clearly suggests a wild bootstrap could avoid the
problem, by conditioning the bootstrap on realized matches in the true sample. Otsu and
Rai (2017) confirm this conjecture, providing a consistent bootstrap procedure for matching
estimators that match on covariates.
Because Otsu and Rai (2017) developed a bootstrap that is valid in general, it naturally
incorporates the bias correction that is sometimes required for consistency of the matching
estimator. This entails the estimation of conditional mean functions for units in both
treatment arms, which introduces an additional source of estimation error. It is reasonable
to suspect that eliminating this estimation error might generate efficiency gains in the
bootstrap, at the cost of generality.
In this chapter, I show that conditional mean estimation is necessary for a valid wild
bootstrap even without bias correction. Considering a special case where matching estima-
tion is consistent without bias correction, I develop a natural wild bootstrap and show that
it fails to consistently estimate the variance of the matching estimator. Potential solutions
to the problem fall into two categories: those that essentially reproduce the bootstrap from
Otsu and Rai (2017), and those that abandon the wild bootstrap entirely.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I introduce notation
and give a formal explanation of matching estimators. In Section 1.3, I propose a wild
bootstrap without bias correction, and show theoretically that it fails in general. In Section
1.4, I provide simulation evidence of the failure. Finally, in Section 1.5 I conclude by
providing an intuition for the failure and some potential avenues for future research.
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1.2 Setup and Notation
Suppose we observe a random sample of sizeN = N1+N0, which consists ofN1 units that
received treatment and N0 units that did not receive treatment. For each unit i = 1, ..., N ,
we observe a triplet consisting of a treatment indicator Di ∈ {0, 1}, a covariate Xi, and the
outcome variable Yi = DiYi(1) + (1−Di)Yi(0). Yi(1) and Yi(0) are the potential outcomes
for unit i when Di = 1 and Di = 0, respectively.
In general, Xi can be a vector of multiple covariates. In this chapter, I restrict my
attention to the case where Xi is scalar, as this is a simple way to eliminate the need for
bias correction. While it is possible for Xi to be a vector of multiple covariates and for bias
correction to be unnecessary, it has no impact on my conclusions whether Xi is a scalar or
vector.
Given this sample, we seek to conduct inference on the average treatment effect for the
treated population2 (the ATT),
τ t = E [Yi(1)− Yi(0) | Di = 1] (1.1)
To estimate τ t, we use an M nearest-neighbor matching estimator of the type studied
in Abadie and Imbens (2006). Matching is based on covariate distance. Formally, the
estimator is described as follows:
τ̂ t =
1
N1
∑
i:Di=1
(
Yi(1)− Ŷi(0)
)
(1.2)
where Ŷi(0) is an estimate of the unobserved potential outcome, defined as
Ŷi(0) =

Yi, if Di = 0,
1
M
∑
j∈JM (i) Yj , if Di = 1
(1.3)
2The restriction to the ATT is without loss of generality. The extension to the case of the average
treatment effect for the untreated population (the ATC) is straightforward, and extending the result to the
case of the average treatment effect for the whole population (the ATE) follows from the representation of
the ATE as a weighted average of the ATT and the ATC.
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JM (i) is the set of indices describing the M closest matches to unit i. Formally, it is
defined as
JM (i) =
j ∈ {1, ..., N} : Dj = 0, ∑
l:Dl=0
I {| Xl −Xi |≤| Xj −Xi |} ≤M
 (1.4)
As an example, suppose that for some treated unit i, Xi = 4. Suppose there are three
control units j, k, l, with Xj = 3.5, Xk = 4.6, Xl = 5. J1(i) is the closest match, and would
thus be the singleton set {j}. J2(i) would be {j, k}, and J3(i) would be {j, k, l}. For the
remainder of the chapter, I generally restrict attention to the case where M = 1 - a common
choice in practice, and one which eases exposition considerably.
It is useful to define Ki as the number of times unit i is used as a match
Ki =

0, if Di = 1,∑
j:Dj=1
I{i ∈ JM (i)}, if Di = 0
(1.5)
Let m(i) be a function that returns the single value in JM (i) when M = 1. Finally, let
µ(d, x) = E [Y | D = d,X = x] and σ2(d, x) = Var (Y | D = d,X = x).
Abadie and Imbens (2006), in their study of matching estimators of this kind, considered
the case where N grows while M remains constant. Otsu and Rai (2017) refer to this as
‘fixed-M asymptotics’. Under the following assumptions, Abadie and Imbens were able to
characterize the asymptotic behavior of τ̂ t.
AI.1 Conditional on Di = d, the sample consists of independent draws from Y,X | D = d
for d ∈ {0, 1}. For some r ≤ 1, N r1/N0 → θ ∈ (0,∞).
AI.2 X is continuously distributed on compact and convex support X ⊂ R. The density of
X is bounded and bounded away from zero on X.
AI.3 D is independent of Y (0) conditional on X = x for almost every x. There exists a
positive constant c such that Pr [D = 1 | X = x] ≤ 1− c for almost every x.
AI.4 For d ∈ {0, 1}, µ(d, x) and σ2(d, x) are Lipschitz in X, and σ2(d, x) is bounded away
from zero on X.
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Assumptions AI.1 through AI.3 are relatively standard. They provide useful conditions
on the sampling process and the distribution of X, along with the standard unconfound-
edness and overlap assumptions necessary to identify the ATT. AI.4 provides smoothness
and bounds that are necessary for the characterization of the bias term and its asymptotic
behavior.
Under these assumptions, Abadie and Imbens (2006) showed that τ̂ t →p τ t, and
√
N1
(
τ̂ t −BtN − τ t
)
σtN
→d N (0, 1) (1.6)
where
BtN =
N∑
i=1
Di
 1
M
∑
j∈JM (i)
[µ(0, Xi)− µ(0, Xj)]

(σtN )
2 = (σt1N )
2 + (σt2)
2
σt1N =
1
N1
N∑
i=1
(
Di + (1−Di)
1
M
Ki
)2
σ2(Di, Xi)
(σ22)
2 = E
[
(µ(1, Xi)− µ(0, Xi)− τ t)2 | Di = 1
]
(1.7)
Inuitively, BtN captures the bias produced by matches that are less than perfect. Since se-
lection on observables is contained in assumptions AI.1 through AI.4, if Xj = Xi, µ(0, Xi)−
µ(0, Xj) = 0 follows trivially. σ
t
1N captures the variance effect of units being matched poten-
tially multiple times3. Finally, (σt2)
2 captures the variance produced by innate differences
in the treatment effect conditional on X. If τ t did not depend on X, for instance, (σt2)
2
would trivially be zero.
When Xi is scalar, B
t
N is op(N
−1/2
1 ) and thus asymptotically ignorable. Alternatively, I
could directly restrict attention to cases where BtN is op(N
−1/2
1 ), which occurs when r > k/2,
effectively placing a strong restriction on the growth rate of the different treatment arms in
the sampling process. Intuitively, BtN is ignorable when N0 grows at least as fast as
√
N1.
It is more common for control groups to be at least as large as treatment groups, so for
3Note that if Ki = 1 for all i, σ
t
1N devoles into the average of σ
2(Di, Xi) over the sample.
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the purposes of estimating the ATT this requirement is often satisfied, further supporting
an exploration for a special case of the bootstrap without bias correction. When BtN is not
ignorable, the bias term grows because the number of matches required grows faster than
the ‘quality’4 of matches shrinks, resulting in the average ‘quality’ of matches decreasing as
N increases.
1.3 Proposed Bootstrap
Otsu and Rai (2017) provide a valid wild bootstrap for the general case of the M -nearest
neighbor matching estimator described above, for any number of continuous covariates. In
their setting, BtN is not guaranteed to be op(N
−1/2
1 ). Thus, as a bias correction is needed in
the estimation procedure, part of the bootstrap must also account for the variance generated
by the bias correction. Otsu and Rai solve this problem by simply bootstrapping the bias
correction itself, which requires estimating of the conditional mean functions µ(d, x) for
d ∈ {0, 1}. It is reasonable to suspect that estimation errors in this step may increase the
estimated variance of τ̂ t, and thus that a bootstrap without the bias correction might be
more efficient, at the cost of being invalid when a bias correction is needed.
The reason a wild bootstrap was conjectured by Abadie and Imbens (2008) is that by
definition, a wild bootstrap will not change the matches and thus will not need to estimate
the distribution of Ki. I consider the following procedure:
1. Estimate τ̂ t using nearest-neighbor matching.
2. Using τ̂ t from step 1, generate residuals ξ̂i =
(
Yi(1)− τ̂ t
)
− Ŷi(0) .
3. Draw a bootstrap auxiliary variable ε∗i from the Rademacher distribution.
4. Create bootstrapped treated outcomes Yi(1)
∗ = Ŷi(0) + τ̂
t + ε∗i ξ̂i.
5. Estimate τ̂ t∗ using nearest-neighbor matching on the bootstrapped sample.
4The ‘quality’ of a match can be thought of as the difference between µ(Xi, 0) and µ(Xj , 0) for i and j
being matched together.
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6. Repeat steps 1-5 B times, and use the sample variance of τ̂ t∗ to estimate the variance
of τ̂ t.
Davidson et al. (2007) provides strong evidence that the Rademacher distribution is
superior for wild bootstrap performance. Indeed, their results suggest that the Rademacher
distribution is one of the best distributions possible. The Rademacher distribution is very
simple, with ε∗i taking the values 1 and −1 with equal probability.
This is a prima facie reasonable procedure. While it may appear odd at first for the
bootstrapped dataset to consist of (Y (1)∗, Y (0)), this is a result of estimating the ATT.
Bootstrapping Y (0) would require defining and constructing estimates of Ŷi(1), which can-
not be done without estimating the average treatment effect for the whole population, or
estimating conditional mean functions as in Otsu and Rai (2017). As τ t is often an object
of interest in itself, a wild bootstrap for this case is worth having.
Unfortunately, the proposed bootstrap is not valid in general. Furthermore, the failure
indicates that any wild bootstrap that does not construct Ŷi(1) will not be valid in general.
The failure is not total - in certain special cases5, the procedure works correctly. The
special cases offer an intuition for why the procedure fails in general. Solving this problem
essentially requires replicating the Otsu and Rai (2017) bootstrap procedure by estimating
conditional mean functions to construct Ŷi(1), or abandoning the wild bootstrap altogether.
The simplest option in the latter category is to bootstrap the treatment indicator Di
rather than Yi. As this approach relies on estimating propensity scores, which is done for all
observations even when estimating the ATT, it avoids the incomplete bootstrapping issue.
This approach is illustrated in Huber et al. (2016) and Adusumilli (2017).
For the proposed bootstrap to work, it would suffice for the following to be true,
sup
q
∣∣∣Pr{√N1 (τ̂ t∗ − τ̂ t) ≤ q | Z}− Pr{√N1 (τ̂ t − τ t) ≤ q}∣∣∣→p 0 (1.8)
5Most notably, in the case where each treated unit has a unique closest match in the control group, and
also in the case where treated units have zero idiosyncratic errors.
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where Z = {Y,D,X} is the entire sample. Abadie and Imbens (2006) show (in Corollary
1) that
√
N1(τ̂
t − τ t)/σtN is asymptotically normal, so (1.8) implies the following:
Var
(√
N1
(
τ̂ t∗ − τ̂ t
)
| Z
)
− (σtN )2 →p 0 (1.9)∣∣∣Pr{√N1 (τ̂ t∗ − τ̂ t) /σtN ≤ t | Z}− Φ(t)∣∣∣→p 0 ∀ t ∈ R (1.10)
Intuitively, (1.9) requires that the bootstrapped estimates τ̂ t∗ have the correct variance,
and (1.10) requires that the bootstrapped estimates are asymptotically normally distributed.
Note that either condition failing to hold is sufficient to prove that the bootstrap does not
work. I will give an abbreviated proof here, as the failure is interesting.
It is possible to recover a representation for τ̂ t∗ from the proposed bootstrap procedure,
τ̂ t∗ = τ̂ t +
1
N1
N∑
i=1
Diξ̂iε
∗
i (1.11)
This representation can be decomposed into a form involving estimated population pa-
rameters and the parameters themselves:
τ̂ t∗ = τ̂ t +
1
N1
N∑
i=1
Diξiε
∗
i +
1
N1
N∑
i=1
Di
(
ξ̂i − ξi
)
ε∗i
= τ̂ t + T t∗N +Q
t∗
N +R
t∗
N (1.12)
where
T t∗N =
1
N1
N∑
i=1
Di
(
µ(1, Xi)− µ(0, Xi)− τ t
)
ε∗i
Qt∗N =
1
N1
N∑
i=1
Di
(
Yi(1)− Ŷi(0)− µ(1, Xi) + µ(0, Xi)
)
ε∗i
Rt∗N =
1
N1
N∑
i=1
Di
(
τ t − τ̂ t
)
ε∗i (1.13)
In simple terms, T t∗N is a term capturing the differences between the true treatment effect
at some value of Xi and the ATT. Q
t∗
N captures the variance contributed by the ‘quality’ of
the matches as well as some remainder terms, and Rt∗N is a pure remainder term.
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Noting that
√
N1
(
τ̂ t∗ − τ̂ t
)
=
√
N1
(
T t∗N +Q
t∗
N +R
t∗
N
)
, it follows that
Var
(√
N1
(
τ̂ t∗ − τ̂ t
)
| Z
)
= N1E
[
(T t∗N )
2 + (Qt∗N )
2 + (Rt∗N )
2 | Z
]
+N1E
[
2
(
T t∗NQ
t∗
N + T
t∗
N R
t∗
N +Q
t∗
NR
t∗
N
)
| Z
]
(1.14)
Under assumptions A1-A4, the following results hold:
E
[
N1(T
t∗
N )
2 | Z
]
→p (σt2)2
E
[
N1(Q
t∗
N )
2 | Z
]
→p (σt1N )′
E
[
N1(R
t∗
N )
2 | Z
]
is Op(N
−1/2
1 )
E
[
2N1
(
T t∗NQ
t∗
N + T
t∗
N R
t∗
N +Q
t∗
NR
t∗
N
)
| Z
]
= 0 (1.15)
The full proof is relegated to Appendix A. Note that E
[
N1(Q
t∗
N )
2 | Z
]
does not con-
verge to (σt1N )
2. This is the failure of the bootstrap procedure. Instead, E
[
N1(Q
t∗
N )
2 | Z
]
converges to (σt1N )
′,
(σt1N )
′ =
1
N1
N∑
i=1
(
Di + (1−Di)
1
M
Ki
)
σ2(Di, Xi) (1.16)
When contrasted with (σt1N )
2, the term involving Ki lacks a power of two. It is easy
to see from this why the bootstrap works when each treated unit has a unique matching
control unit - in that case, Ki = 1 for all i, so the missing power of two has no effect and
(σt1N )
′ = (σt1N )
2. Due to this failure, the variance of the bootstrapped τ̂ t∗’s is incorrect,
and thus the bootstrap consistency condition does not hold.
1.4 Simulations
In this section, I use the data generating process from Abadie and Imbens (2008), which
is described as follows:
1. The marginal distribution of X is uniform on the interval [0, 1].
2. The ratio of treated units to control units is N1/N0 = α for some positive α.
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3. The propensity score e(X) = Pr [D = 1 | X = x] is a constant function of α.
4. The distribution of Y (1) is degenerate, with Pr [Yi(1) = τ ] = 1.
5. The conditional distribution of Y (0) | X = x is standard normal.
This DGP enabled Abadie and Imbens (2008) to find an analytic representation for both
the conditional and unconditional variance of τ̂ t,
Var
(
τ̂ t
)
=
1
N1
+
3
2
(N1 − 1)(N0 + 8/3)
N1(N0 + 1)(N0 + 2)
Var
(
τ̂ t | Z
)
=
1
N21
N∑
i=1
K2i (1.17)
To provide evidence not merely of a failure in the bootstrap procedure, but of the
exact failure identified above, I construct a synthetically corrected bootstrap estimator by
calculating T t∗N , R
t∗
N , and (σ
t
1N )
2 directly in each bootstrapped sample. The synthetically
corrected bootstrap estimator is given by
τ̂ t∗s = τ̂
t + T t∗N + (σ
t
1N )
2 +Rt∗N (1.18)
This estimator can be thought of as what a correct bootstrap procedure analogous to
the proposed bootstrap would produce, if it were possible to correct the procedure without
conditional mean estimation. All results that follow come from a 10,000-iteration Monte-
Carlo simulation, with τ t = 5 and 200 bootstraps per iteration.
Figure 1.1 represents a baseline case, with N = 1000 and an equal number of treated
and control units. The proposed bootstrap (histogram in red) consistently underestimates
the true variance of the matching estimator by a significant margin. The synthetically cor-
rected bootstrap (turquoise) correctly estimates the target variance. Given the theoretical
underpinnings of the failure, this is expected. The missing power in (σt1N )
′ will result in
underestimated variance whenever
∑N
i=1(Di + (1−Di)
1
MKi) <
∑N
i=1(DI + (1−Di)
1
MKi)
2,
and this will almost always occur when the ratio of treated to control units is close to one.
This logic suggests that in settings with significantly more control observations (i.e.
α << 1), the proposed bootstrap will underestimate the target variance by a smaller
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amount. This is because decreasing α causes the probability of any Ki exceeding 1 to
decrease. Simulations confirm this conjecture. Figure 1.2 is the same simulation as Figure
1.1, except with 3 times as many control units for an α of 13 .
Figure 1.1 Proposed and Synthetically Corrected Bootstrap (α = 1)
The rate at which the proposed bootstrap approaches the correct variance as α ap-
proaches 0 is very slow. Figure 1.3 displays the results from a simulation with α = 0.05, and
still the proposed bootstrap underestimates the target variance by a problematic amount.
In the appendix, I present simulation results for the estimation of the average treat-
ment effect on the untreated population (the ATC). The Abadie and Imbens (2008) data
generating process causes the failure in the proposed bootstrap to disappear due to the
degenerate distribution of Y (1). With a data generating process designed to be analogous
to the Abadie and Imbens (2008) process but for ATC estimation, exactly the same failure
would obtain.
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Figure 1.2 Proposed and Synthetically Corrected Bootstrap (α = 1/3)
1.5 Conclusion
I proposed a prima facie reasonable bootstrap for estimating the variance of the match-
ing estimator of the ATT when bias correction is unnecessary. I identified a flaw in the
procedure, which is not a failure to estimate the distribution of Ki as in the naive boot-
strap. Instead, the failure is related to the way in which control (treated) observations
contribute variance to the final estimator of the ATT (ATC). The distribution of Ki is
an important component of the variance of τ̂ t because it determines how important the
idiosyncratic error of unit i is to that variance. The proposed bootstrap fails to correctly
perturb the idiosyncratic errors of control units, leading to a consistent underestimation of
the true variance.
13
Figure 1.3 Proposed and Synthetically Corrected Bootstrap (α = 0.05)
Otsu and Rai (2017) avoid this issue by sampling and bootstrapping two separate resid-
uals. They construct these residuals by estimating the conditional mean functions µ(0, x)
and µ(1, x). Avoiding the estimation errors associated with using the estimated functions
µ̂(0, x) and µ̂(1, x) in the bootstrap was the was the leading source of potential improve-
ments motivating this bootstrap. Thus, it appears that Otsu and Rai (2017) is currently
the most efficient wild bootstrap procedure for estimating the variance of the matching
estimator for treatment effects.
It is possible that a more complex bootstrap procedure may work specifically for es-
timating the average treatment effect for the whole population, when bias correction is
unnecessary. Otsu and Rai (2017) requires only that µ̂(d, x) satisfies a condition on con-
vergence rates, which may be satisfied by the implicit estimator µ̂(Di, Xi) = ̂Yi(Di, Xi)
constructed in the normal matching estimator. If so, it would be possible to perform the
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Otsu and Rai (2017) bootstrap without adding an extra step to estimate µ̂(d, x) by using the
implicit estimator. However, it is unlikely that performance improvements could be gained,
as estimation errors would still affect the final bootstrap results and the estimation errors
associated with the implicit estimator are likely to be large compared to explicit estimators
of conditional mean functions. Otsu and Rai (2017) also note that when bias correction is
unnecessary, it is possible to construct a valid subsampling procedure based on Politis and
Romano (1994) that does not require estimation of µ̂(d, x), although the computational cost
of this procedure is significant compared to a wild bootstrap and the procedure is sensitive
to the choice of subsample size when N is not large.
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CHAPTER 2. MATCHING AS WEIGHT SELECTION: A
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING MATCHING ALGORITHMS
Due to non-smooth behavior of matching estimators, the bias/variance trade-offs asso-
ciated with changes in the matching procedure are opaque. This leaves practitioners with
limited guidance when choosing a matching procedure and its parameters. I cast matching
estimators as a subset of a larger class of weighting estimators and use insights gained from
considering optimal weights to offer further guidance in selection of matching procedures,
selection of smoothing parameters, and potentially fruitful directions for future research.
2.1 Introduction
Matching estimation techniques have significant intuitive appeal and are relatively easy
to implement. It is thus no surprise that despite Abadie and Imbens (2006) showing that
they fail to reach the semi-parametric efficiency bound, they remain a popular approach
to program evaluation. Perhaps due to the intuitive simplicity, a number of different ap-
proaches to matching have been proposed, none of which are obviously more or less plausible
than others.
Practitioners today face a choice set that includesM−nearest neighbor matching (Abadie
and Imbens, 2006), caliper matching (Cochran and Rubin, 1973), radius matching (Dehejia
and Wahba, 1999), coarsened exact matching (Iacus et al., 2009), matching on the propen-
sity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1985) and genetic matching (Diamond and Sekhon,
2013). In addition, each of these procedures requires the choice of at least one smoothing
parameter (e.g. number of matches, kernel and bandwidth, degree of coarsening). King
16
et al. (2011) suggests that researchers should conduct an “extensive, iterative, and typically
manual search across different matching solutions,” but this is unrealistically difficult to
execute in practicer, and it is not clear what one should look for in this search.
In this chapter I aim to aid researchers facing this choice set by developing a framework
that shrinks the relevant search space, identifying ‘directions’ within that space in which
improvements are more or less likely to be found. This is accomplished by casting matching
procedures as weight selectors which are followed by simple weighted difference-in-means
estimation. Recasting matching estimators in this way allows me to identify infeasible
optimal weights, and use the deviations from optimal weighting to generate insights about
competing matching procedures.
This chapter’s main contribution is to derive weights which are optimal in the sense
of reducing mean-squared error (MSE), weights that are sometimes estimable1. First, I
show that in the unconstrained case optimal weights are nonzero (outside of a degenerate
case). I extend the result and prove that - subject to mild regularity conditions - the
MSE-optimal weights are nonzero in situations that closely approximate those that apply
to weights generated by matching. Using this insight, I develop a illustrative ‘augmented’
matching algorithm and verify through simulations that it behaves as my results suggest,
confirming the validity of said insights. Further, the illustrative procedure sheds light on
how important it is to avoid nonzero weights as features of the data-generating process
change.
Overall, my results suggest that some form of kernel matching is likely to be most
promising current approach in practice, as well as the most promising approach for further
development of matching procedures. This is primarily due to the flexibility inherent in
kernel matching, and echoes results from Armstrong and Kolesár (2018), who arrive at
their conclusions from the consideration of worst-case MSE for weighting estimators in
general.
1However, due to the form of the optimal weight functions, the cumulative effect of estimation errors is
likely to limit the gains from using estimated optimal weights.
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The approach I take necessitates conditioning on the sample, which has both pros and
cons2. As Armstrong and Kolesár (2018) note, conditioning on the sample and realized
treatment assignments takes into account the finite-sample possibility that imbalance may
be present even with random assignment, but also precludes the use of the propensity score
to gain efficiency. Like Armstrong and Kolesár, I do not intend to argue for or against
conditioning on the sample - both approaches are valuable for understanding the behavior
of program evaluation estimators.
This chapter contributes to a robust literature that offers advice to researchers choosing
matching procedures and smoothing parameters. One strand of this literature contributes
via simulation studies which contrast different matching procedures and smoothing param-
eters. For instance, Huber et al. (2013) generates data intended to replicate the features
of a labor market dataset from Germany, and finds that radius matching with a regression
adjustment performs best overall. Zhao (2004) considers the choice of the distance metric
used in the matching procedure, a question that has received surprisingly little attention.
King and Nielsen (2016) argues that propensity-score based pruning methods are inferior
to other pruning methods (a claim presaged by Hahn, 1998).
Another strand of literature considers the use of weighting estimators for treatment
effects more generally, without a strong focus on the connection to the method of match-
ing. Most recently, Kallus (2016) and Armstrong and Kolesár (2018) develop methods of
choosing weights that minimize worst-case MSE. Armstrong and Kolesár (2018) go on to
provide asymptotically valid confidence intervals for a class ‘minimax’ optimal estimators
they propose. Such ‘minimax’ estimators are designed to limit the MSE of an estimator
subjected to a ‘worst-case’ data-generating process, characterized by a smoothness restric-
tion on the conditional mean function. Hazlett (2016) develops a method to determine
which weights achieve unbiased estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated.
Hainmueller (2012) proposes a weight-selection algorithm that determines weights based on
2For a detailed discussion of this point, see Abadie et al. (2014))
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moment conditions selected by the researcher, and Chan et al. (2015) employs a similar
approach to develop a globally efficient calibration estimator. In contrast to this chapter,
this strand of literature is generally concerned with cases where there is misspecification in
either the regression function or the propensity score model.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces notation
and shows how matching estimators can be represented as weight selection procedures.
In Section 2.3, I derive optimal weights for unconstrained and constrained cases, prove
that optimal constrained weights are nonzero subject to mild regularity conditions, and
offer some intuition for why this is true. In Section 2.4, I use that intuition to develop a
simple ‘augmented’ matching procedure, and contrast it’s behavior with nearest-neighbor
matching and caliper matching through simulation. Finally, in Section 2.5 I conclude and
suggest some directions for future research.
2.2 Setup & Notation
My notation closely follows Otsu and Rai (2017). We observe a dataset of size N ,
consisting of N1 units that received treatment and N0 units that did not. For each unit
i = 1, ..., N , we observe a binary treatment indicator Di, a covariate (potentially vector-
valued) Xi, and an outcome,
Yi =

Yi(0) if Di = 0,
Yi(1) if Di = 1
where Yi(1) and Yi(0) are the potential outcomes for unit i if Di = 1 and Di = 0 respec-
tively. Given this sample, we seek to estimate the average treatment effect for the treated
population3 (henceforth, the ATT)
τ t = E [Yi(1)− Yi(0) | Di = 1]
3Extension of my results to the case of the average treatment effect for the untreated population (the
ATC) is straightforward. Extension to the case of the average treatment effect for the whole population (the
ATE) is less so, but can most easily be recovered by noting that the ATE is a weighted average of the ATT
and the ATC.
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To gain traction on this estimand, it is necessary that treatment is partially uncon-
founded4, that the probability of treatment assignment is bounded away from 1, and that
the sample is composed of conditionally independent draws from the population distribu-
tion. Formally,
A1. D is independent of Y (0) conditional on X = x.
A2. Pr [D = 1 | X = x] < 1− c for some c > 0.
A3. Conditional on Di = d, the sample consists of independent draws from Y,X | D = d
for d ∈ {0, 1}.
These assumptions are standard in the matching literature. Assumptions A1 and A3
together are often referred to as ‘selection on observables’. They ensures that the potential
outcomes of two observations i and j will be equal if Xi = Xj , a requirement for match-
ing estimators to be asymptotically consistent. Assumption A2, often called the ’overlap’
condition, ensures that there are no portions of the covariate space in which all units are
treated. If overlap does not hold, the ATT is not identified for subsets of the covariate
space.
Before casting matching as a weight-selection procedure, let µ(x, d) = E [Y | X = x,D = d],
σ2(x, d) = Var (Y | X = x,D = d), and further let εi = Yi − µ(Xi, Di). Let I {A} be the
indicator function that returns 1 when A is true, and 0 otherwise. Let |x| = (x′x)1/2 be the
standard Euclidean vector norm. Let JM (i) be defined as
JM (i) =
j ∈ {1, ..., N} : Dj = 1−Di, ∑
Dl=1−Di
I {|Xl −Xi| ≤ |Xj −Xi|} ≤M
 (2.1)
The standard M -nearest neighbor matching estimator for the ATT is then given by
τ̂ t =
1
N1
∑
Di=1
(
Yi − Ŷi(0)
)
(2.2)
4Full unconfoundedness would be necessary when estimating the ATE.
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where
Ŷi(0) =

Yi if Di = 0,
1
M
∑
j∈JM (i) Yj if Di = 1
In simple terms, the M -nearest neighbor matching estimator imputes the value of Ŷi(0)
as the average outcome values of the M control units with covariates closest to Xi. To recast
matching as a weight-selection procedure, I will make use of an alternative representation
from Abadie and Imbens (2006). First, define,
KM (i) =
N∑
j=1
I {i ∈ JM (j)} (2.3)
KM (i) tracks the number of times that unit i is used as a match for another unit. To
illustrate with a degenerate case, if N1 = 10 and N0 = 1, all 10 treated units would be
matched to the single control unit. The value of KM (i) for that control unit would then
be 10. Since it is more common to match with replacement, even in non-degenerate cases
KM (i) can often be larger than 1. By convention, when estimating the ATT, KM (i) = 0
when Di = 1. It is straightforward to show that (2.2) can be represented as
τ̂ t =
1
N1
∑
Di=1
Yi −
1
MN1
∑
Di=0
KM (i)Yi (2.4)
By the nature of the M -nearest neighbor matching estimator,
∑
Di=0
KM (i) = MN1.
Letting ki = KM (i)/
∑
Di=0
KM (i), we can rewrite (2.4) as
τ̂ t =
1
N1
∑
Di=1
Yi −
∑
Di=0
kiYi (2.5)
which is a weighted difference-in-means estimator.
2.3 Optimal Weights
2.3.1 Unconstrained Weights
It is natural to ask at this point what the optimal value of the vector ki is, and minimizing
MSE is a natural objective to consider. Following Abadie and Imbens (2006), I characterize
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the MSE of (2.5) in a useful way. Define the sample average treatment effect on the treated
(SATT):
τ t(X) =
1
N1
N∑
i=1
(µ(1, Xi)− µ(0, Xi))
and note that the difference between τ̂ t and the SATT is
τ̂ t − τ t(X) = 1
N1
∑
Di=1
Yi −
∑
Di=0
kiYi −
1
N1
∑
Di=1
µ(Xi, 1) +
1
N1
∑
Di=1
µ(Xi, 0) (2.6)
Recall that εi = Yi − µ(Xi, Di), and decompose the first term above to get
τ̂ t − τ t(X) = 1
N1
∑
Di=1
εi −
∑
Di=0
kiYi +
1
N1
∑
Di=1
µ(Xi, 0)
The error associated with τ̂ t is thus
τ̂ t − τ =
(
τ t(X)− τ
)
+
1
N1
∑
Di=1
εi −
∑
Di=0
kiYi +
1
N1
∑
Di=1
µ(Xi, 0)
This offers a clear intuitive understanding of what an optimal vector of weights ki would
do. We cannot affect the value of
(
τ t(X)− τ
)
through our estimation procedure - it is a
function of the sampling procedure. The role of ki is to turn
∑
Di=0
kiYi into an estimate of
1
N1
∑
Di=1
µ(Xi, 0), the average of the unobserved counterfactual outcomes for the treated
arm. The problem of minimizing MSE is isomorphic to the problem of setting the weighted
sum of random variables to be as close as possible to some constant value. For ease of
exposition, let 1N1
∑
Di=1
µ(Xi, 0) = µ(XD1 , 0). Minimizing the MSE of the estimator in
(2.5) is equivalent to solving
min
ki
E
µ(XD1 , 0)− ∑
Di=0
kiYi
2 (2.7)
The solution to this problem leads to my first result:
Theorem 1 Let σ2(Xi, Di) = σ
2
i . If σ
2
i 6= σ2j in general, the weights {ki} that solve the
minimization problem in (2.7) are given by:
k∗i = µ(XD1 , 0)µ(Xi, 0)
∏
j 6=i σ
2
j∑N
i=1
(
µ(Xi, 0)2
∏
j 6=i σ
2
j
)
+
∏N
i=1 σ
2
i
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All proofs are relegated to the appendix. The requirement that σ2i 6= σ2j rules out the
simplest form of homoskedasticity and is required to prevent the minimization problem
from becoming degenerate. If σ2i is a non-degenerate function of the covariate vector Xi,
Theorem 1 holds and the k∗i is at least in principle identified.
Some features of the optimal weight vector are worth noting at this point. As one
would expect, if σ2i is lower than σ
2
j , k
∗
i will be larger than k
∗
j if i and j have equivalent
conditional means. In addition, the optimal weight vector {k∗i } contains no zero elements
unless µ(Xi, 0) = 0 for some i, or µ(XD1 , 0) = 0, both of which are degenerate cases.
2.3.2 Constrained Weights
Unconstrained weights are of limited use for evaluation of matching procedures, because
without constraints weights can be negative and can sum to something other than 1. Neither
of these outcomes is a ‘legal’ outcome of any commonly used matching procedure.
Different matching procedures have different finite-sample constraints. For instance, if
one uses M nearest-neighbor matching, conditional on the sample the only weights that can
be generated are integer multiples of 1MN1 . By way of contrast, kernel matching is capable
of producing weights that lie anywhere on the interval [0, 1].
However, weights that are optimal subject to sample-specific constraints are unlikely to
be useful in comparisons of different matching procedures - at best, they may shed light
on the trade-offs involved in the choice of smoothing parameters. These trade-offs are
less opaque, so I will focus on constraints that are shared across matching procedures - in
particular, that individual weights are non-negative and that the weight vector sums to 1.
One can think of these as the ‘asymptotic’ constraints that obtain on matching procedures
- if the sample size is unknown, these are the constraints that obtain for all matching
procedures. Further refinement of the constraints is impossible without knowledge of the
sample size.
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Theorem 2 provides a characterization of the MSE-optimal weights, subject to the con-
straint that weights are non-negative and sum to 1.
Theorem 2 The weights {k∗i } that solve the minimization problem in (2.7), subject to
ki > 0 ∀i and
∑N
i=1 ki = 1, are given by:
kc∗i =
1− Y1
∑N0
i=1
Yi
σ2i
+
∑N0
i=1
Y 2i
σ2i
+ µ(XD1 , 0)
(
Y1
∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
−
∑N0
i=1
Yi
σ2i
)
σ2i
(∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
+
(∑N0
i=1
Y 2i
σ2i
)(∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
)
−
(∑N0
i=1
Yi
σ2i
)2)
+
∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
Y1
∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
−
∑N0
i=1
Yi
σ2i
σ21 (Y1 − Yi)
σ2i
(2.8)
Unfortunately, the form of kc∗i is not illuminating - it is, for instance, not at all clear
what guarantees that kc∗i is non-zero. In order to derive a strict positivity result for k
c∗
i , I
require an additional assumption:
A4. µ(XD1 , 0) lies strictly between mini [µ(Xi, 0) | Di = 0] and maxi [µ(Xi, 0 | Di = 0)].
This assumption, while it appears quite restrictive, is rather general. It can be thought
of as a finite-sample analog to the overlap condition A2. In most cases, if A4 is violated it
is likely that AI.2 is violated as well. However, it is possible that A4 is violated without
violating A2 in very small samples, or with extremely large values of σ2i . In either case, if A4
is violated, matching estimation will likely perform poorly with any matching procedure.
With this additional assumption, a strict positivity result for {kc∗i } can be proven,
Lemma 1 Given assumptions A1 through A4, the MSE-optimal weight vector {kc∗i } con-
tains no zero elements.
I again relegate the full proof of Lemma 1 to the appendix. In simple terms, the proof
works by showing that a vector containing a zero element can always be modified in a way
that both removes the zero element and strictly reduces MSE - similar to how proofs related
to Nash Equilibria search for profitable deviations.
The reason Lemma 1 is true relates to the shape of the function that describes the
change in MSE when weight is ‘shifted’ from one observation to another. This function is
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strictly concave and is always strictly increasing in a neighborhood around a zero ‘shift’, for
appropriately selected observations. Intuitively, the ‘change in MSE function’ has this shape
because the variance of the resulting estimator increases as a function of the squared weight
on observations, while the bias increases as a function of the weight itself. The MSE-optimal
weight vector never generates an unbiased estimate of the ATT - as one would expect, it
achieves the minimal MSE by making ‘profitable’ trade-offs between bias and variance until
no such trade-off remains.
2.4 Evaluating Matching Procedures
2.4.1 ‘Augmented’ Matching
Lemma 1 is an interesting result from the perspective of one seeking to evaluate matching
procedures. To the best of my knowledge, no commonly used matching procedure is designed
to lower the chances of zero elements in the weight vector. Indeed, in some common settings
many matching procedures will generate a wealth of zeros in the weight vector. However,
the proof of Lemma 1 makes clear that the optimal weights, while nonzero, are nonetheless
vanishingly small when the ‘quality’ of a match5 is poor. If one is doing nearest-neighbor
matching with M = 1, it is entirely possible that zero weights are closer to optimal than the
lowest positive weight that can be assigned. Nonetheless, Lemma 1 suggests that we should
consider more carefully the situations that can cause zero weights, and consider whether
those weights should truly be zero.
A less obvious insight from Lemma 1 is that units with similar conditional means and
similar variances should receive similar weights. It is this insight which guides the ‘aug-
mented’ matching algorithm proposed below. The algorithm below is to estimate the ATT,
but the extension to other estimands is immediate.
5In contrast to Chapter 1, I refer here to ‘quality’ in the sense of how far µ(Xi, 0) is from µ(XD1 , 0), not
how far µ(Xi, Di) is from some matched unit’s µ(Xj , Di).
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‘Augmented’ Matching for the ATT
1. Perform standard nearest-neighbor matching with M = 1.
2. For each treated unit i, define a distance ri = |Xi − Xm(i)| + δ, where m(i) returns
the index of the matched control unit from step 1.
3. Search for control units whose covariates lie within a ball of radius ri around Xi. If
such control units exist, assign them as matches for unit i as well.
4. Use the resulting matches and weight vector to estimate τ t.
This procedure encapsulates nearest-neighbor matching as a special case (if δ is set to
zero, it is numerically identical to nearest-neighbor matching with M = 1). The idea is
that, having already matched Xi to Xm(i), it is likely that units some small δ further away
are good enough matches to generate a variance decrease that outweighs the bias increase
that comes from making a worse match.
To be clear, I am not advancing this procedure as the best that can be done given
these insights. Rather, it is to illustrate that the insights derived are valid, and that this
framework for evaluating matching procedures works. As I will show with simulations, this
augmented matching procedure is too simple, but it serves to refine the insights derived so
far.
2.4.2 Simulation Evidence
For my simulations, I designed a data-generating process that allows for a number of
modifications that shed light on the relative performance of nearest-neighbor and augmented
matching. The basic framework is quite simple - the outcome variable Yi is constructed as
Yi = Xi + Diτ(Xi) + εi. I vary the distribution of Xi and εi across simulations. τ(Xi)
is defined as τ(Xi) = I{Xi ≥ 0}
(
Xi + 2X
2
i − 0.4X3i
)
, to generate a conditional average
treatment effect function with significant heterogeneity.
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First, I draw Xi from a uniform distribution between 0 and 6. For each unit i, I also
draw σ2i from a uniform distribution between 2 and 5, and then draw εi from a mean-
zero normal distribution with appropriate variance. I consider two matching procedures -
nearest-neighbor matching with M neighbors and augmented matching as described above.
I consider five different values of M and δ. Finally, I consider two cases for the sample -
one with 500 units in each treatment arm, and one with 250 treated units and 750 control
units. Table 2.1 presents the results, with 1000 simulations in each row.
Table 2.1 High Variance, Uniform X
N1/N0 Matching Procedure ATT MSE ATC MSE ATE MSE
1 NN Matching M = 1 0.094 0.099 0.077
NN Matching M = 2 0.076 0.078 0.067
NN Matching M = 3 0.069 0.072 0.065
NN Matching M = 4 0.066 0.069 0.062
NN Matching M = 5 0.065 0.066 0.061
1 Augmented Matching δ = 0.25 0.063 0.146 0.080
Augmented Matching δ = 0.50 0.063 0.234 0.102
Augmented Matching δ = 0.75 0.063 0.352 0.131
Augmented Matching δ = 1.00 0.063 0.480 0.163
Augmented Matching δ = 1.25 0.064 0.605 0.194
1/3 NN Matching M = 1 0.142 0.114 0.100
NN Matching M = 2 0.108 0.096 0.089
NN Matching M = 3 0.095 0.088 0.083
NN Matching M = 4 0.090 0.085 0.081
NN Matching M = 5 0.086 0.083 0.080
1/3 Augmented Matching δ = 0.25 0.078 0.202 0.147
Augmented Matching δ = 0.50 0.078 0.293 0.198
Augmented Matching δ = 0.75 0.078 0.412 0.266
Augmented Matching δ = 1.00 0.078 0.541 0.340
Augmented Matching δ = 1.25 0.078 0.664 0.410
When estimating the ATT, the ‘quality’ of a match is simply |Xi − Xm(i)|, while for
the ATC the ‘quality’ is |τ(Xi) − τ(Xm(i))|. With this data generating process, the latter
grows dramatically faster than the former with the difference between Xi and Xm(i). This
explains the relatively poor performance of augmented matching in the ATC case.
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The ATT case makes clear that the idea of augmented matching works in some settings.
Note that even with M = 5, augmented matching outperforms nearest-neighbor matching
with any tested value of δ. This illustrates the chief advantages of augmented matching
over changing M - it allows for a different number of matches to be found for any given
unit, and has a large ‘sweet spot’ for values of δ when match ‘quality’ is relatively flat.
In a second simulation, I change the distribution of σ2i to a uniform distribution between
1 and 2, significantly restricting the potential size of idiosyncratic errors. Otherwise, the
data-generating process was unchanged. Table 2.2 reports the results.
Lowering the size of idiosyncratic errors on observations would be expected to reduce
the relative importance of variance in determining total MSE. Thus, one would expect
augmented matching to perform more poorly relative to nearest neighbor matching in this
simulation, and that is precisely what is observed.
Table 2.2 Low Variance, Uniform X
N1/N0 Matching Procedure ATT MSE ATC MSE ATE MSE
1 NN Matching M = 1 0.017 0.018 0.014
NN Matching M = 2 0.014 0.014 0.012
NN Matching M = 3 0.012 0.013 0.011
NN Matching M = 4 0.012 0.012 0.011
NN Matching M = 5 0.012 0.012 0.011
1 Augmented Matching δ = 0.25 0.016 0.097 0.033
Augmented Matching δ = 0.50 0.016 0.186 0.055
Augmented Matching δ = 0.75 0.016 0.304 0.084
Augmented Matching δ = 1.00 0.016 0.433 0.117
Augmented Matching δ = 1.25 0.016 0.558 0.148
1/3 NN Matching M = 1 0.025 0.021 0.018
NN Matching M = 2 0.019 0.017 0.016
NN Matching M = 3 0.017 0.016 0.015
NN Matching M = 4 0.016 0.015 0.015
NN Matching M = 5 0.086 0.083 0.080
1/3 Augmented Matching δ = 0.25 0.018 0.137 0.08
Augmented Matching δ = 0.50 0.018 0.225 0.133
Augmented Matching δ = 0.75 0.018 0.340 0.200
Augmented Matching δ = 1.00 0.018 0.466 0.270
Augmented Matching δ = 1.25 0.078 0.664 0.410
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One potential issue with the augmented matching algorithm is that δ is fixed for all
units. In practice, if the distribution of observations within the covariate space diverges
significantly from a uniform distribution, this may cause augmented matching to perform
quite poorly. In particular, in areas of the covariate space where observations are sparse,
augmented matching is likely to make a small number of additional matches, and those
additional matches are likely to be poor quality.
To investigate this possibility, in Table 2.3 I change the data-generating process, draw-
ing Xi from a N(0, 2) distribution. This generates a large mass of units around 0, with
significantly fewer units available as one moves away from 0. I return to the high-variance
case in terms of idiosyncratic errors, drawing σ2i from a U [2, 5] distribution.
Table 2.3 High Variance, Normal X
N1/N0 Matching Procedure ATT MSE ATC MSE ATE MSE
1 NN Matching M = 1 0.088 0.088 0.068
NN Matching M = 2 0.067 0.070 0.058
NN Matching M = 3 0.063 0.065 0.057
NN Matching M = 4 0.062 0.063 0.056
NN Matching M = 5 0.059 0.062 0.056
1 Augmented Matching δ = 0.25 0.062 0.414 0.146
Augmented Matching δ = 0.50 0.062 0.415 0.147
Augmented Matching δ = 0.75 0.062 0.406 0.145
Augmented Matching δ = 1.00 0.062 0.391 0.141
Augmented Matching δ = 1.25 0.062 0.371 0.137
1/3 NN Matching M = 1 0.123 0.114 0.098
NN Matching M = 2 0.097 0.094 0.084
NN Matching M = 3 0.086 0.087 0.079
NN Matching M = 4 0.081 0.083 0.077
NN Matching M = 5 0.078 0.081 0.075
1/3 Augmented Matching δ = 0.25 0.076 0.430 0.276
Augmented Matching δ = 0.50 0.076 0.441 0.282
Augmented Matching δ = 0.75 0.076 0.435 0.279
Augmented Matching δ = 1.00 0.076 0.421 0.271
Augmented Matching δ = 1.25 0.076 0.404 0.262
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Somewhat surprisingly, the story is largely unchanged from the previous simulations.
The relative comparison between nearest neighbor matching and augmented matching is
similar to before, and nearest neighbor matching is not noticeably outperforming relative
to when covariates were distributed uniformly.
For thoroughness, Table 2.4 reports results from a final simulation that draws σ2i from
a U [1, 2] distribution.
Table 2.4 Low Variance, Normal X
N1/N0 Matching Procedure ATT MSE ATC MSE ATE MSE
1 NN Matching M = 1 0.016 0.017 0.013
NN Matching M = 2 0.012 0.015 0.011
NN Matching M = 3 0.011 0.014 0.011
NN Matching M = 4 0.011 0.015 0.011
NN Matching M = 5 0.011 0.015 0.011
1 Augmented Matching δ = 0.25 0.016 0.373 0.103
Augmented Matching δ = 0.50 0.016 0.374 0.104
Augmented Matching δ = 0.75 0.016 0.365 0.102
Augmented Matching δ = 1.00 0.017 0.349 0.099
Augmented Matching δ = 1.25 0.017 0.330 0.095
1/3 NN Matching M = 1 0.022 0.023 0.019
NN Matching M = 2 0.017 0.020 0.017
NN Matching M = 3 0.015 0.019 0.016
NN Matching M = 4 0.014 0.019 0.016
NN Matching M = 5 0.014 0.019 0.016
1/3 Augmented Matching δ = 0.25 0.020 0.361 0.212
Augmented Matching δ = 0.50 0.020 0.373 0.218
Augmented Matching δ = 0.75 0.020 0.367 0.216
Augmented Matching δ = 1.00 0.020 0.354 0.209
Augmented Matching δ = 1.25 0.020 0.337 0.200
It is interesting to note that when X is distributed normally, augmented matching
performs better in the ATC case as δ increases - a reversal of the behavior observed when
X was distributed uniformly. However, it is clear that augmented matching in this form is
not an appropriate technique for the estimation of the ATC, due to the relatively higher
importance of bias in that case.
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2.4.3 Discussion
A clear implication of the simulation results is that the correct δ is different when
estimating the ATT and the ATC. Given the significant similarities between augmented
matching, radius matching, and kernel matching, it is likely that this is true for the latter
procedures as well. To the best of my knowledge, choosing the bandwidth separately for
the ATT and ATC is not a common approach in practice. Since the ATE is a weighted
average of the ATT and ATC, such a proposal is likely worth serious investigation, but it
is beyond the scope of this investigation.
The simulations make clear that the insights derived from considering the MSE-minimizing
weight vector are valid. In particular, practitioners should use economic intuition and knowl-
edge of the empirical context (where possible) to weigh the relative importance of idiosyn-
cratic errors and bias in the sample. In settings where bias is likely to be of low importance
(for instance, if it is likely that the treatment effect is constant across X and the parameter
of interest is the ATT), it is more likely that MSE can be reduced by matching to multiple
units, or using procedures like radius and kernel matching which have strong similarities to
the ‘augmented’ matching studied here. The same conclusion holds when there are many
more observations in the ‘donor pool’ than in the pool of units to be matched (e.g. when
estimating the ATT with many more control units than treated units).
2.5 Conclusion
Taking an approach similar to that of Armstrong and Kolesár (2018) and Kallus (2016),
I derived unconstrained MSE-minimizing weights, and MSE-minimizing weights subject to
constraints that approximate those implied by many common matching procedures. Subject
to a mild condition on covariate balance, MSE-minimizing weights are nonzero, and units
with similar conditional means receive similar weights.
I use an illustrative, and very simple, ‘augmented’ matching procedure that builds in
behavior meant to generate weights that are closer to MSE-optimal, and contrast it with
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nearest neighbor matching in a variety of settings. I find that the ‘augmented’ procedure
compares favorably to nearest-neighbor matching when idiosyncratic errors are an important
driver of MSE, while significantly under-performing when bias is relatively more important.
While the ‘augmented’ matching procedure itself is unsuitable for practical use in its
current form, it confirms the insights I derive from the contrast between MSE-minimizing
weights and weights from nearest neighbor matching. Practitioners can generate potentially
significant reductions in MSE by carefully considering what they can reasonably determine
about the data generating process, whether from economic intuition, knowledge of the
empirical context, or knowledge of the data gathering process. In particular, my results
suggest that defaulting to M nearest neighbor matching with M = 1 is likely to leave
efficiency gains on the table in many common settings, but is a good conservative approach.
This echoes Armstrong and Kolesár (2018), who note that when the data generating process
is sufficiently ‘bad’, the minimax optimal estimator is nearest neighbor matching with one
match.
Further development of the ‘augmented’ matching procedure may be worthwhile. In
particular, the implication that the optimal δ differs when estimating the ATT and the
ATC offers a potential route to cure the under-performance observed when bias is important,
through a data-driven selection of δ. It is worth investigating whether this extends to radius
and kernel matching procedures as well.
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CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECT OF TEACHER GENDER ON
STUDENTS OF DIFFERING ABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM A
RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT
Gender dynamics may play an important role in the determination of student outcomes
in education. Exploiting random assignment of students to teachers in a field experiment,
I study heterogeneity in the impact of teacher gender on the math and reading test scores
for primary school students of differing ability. I find that assignment to a female teacher
is generally positive for male students while having no significant effect for female students.
In addition, I find very little heterogeneity in the effect of teacher gender on the ability axis,
suggesting that average effect estimates do not mask significant heterogeneity. My results
are consistent with differential teacher behavior based on gender stereotypes, and somewhat
inconsistent with differential student behavior based on gender stereotypes.
3.1 Introduction
Achievement on school tests has important implications for students in both the short
and the long run. In the short run, test scores serve as signals to students about their
ability and induce students to choose different educational paths (Mechtenberg, 2009; Lavy,
2008; Lavy and Sand, 2018; Terrier, 2016). In the long run, these choices have major
implications for lifetime earnings and health outcomes (Joensen and Nielsen, 2016; Autor
and Wasserman, 2013; Krueger, 2017). Gender dynamics between students and teachers
can play a significant role in determining student test score outcomes (Dee, 2005; Lavy,
2008; Antecol et al., 2015; Terrier, 2016).
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To date, the study of gender dynamics in the classroom has mostly considered average
effects, which can mask significant heterogeneity (Bitler et al., 2006). It is possible that the
effect of teacher gender on students might depend significantly on student ability, which
would have important implications for policy - particularly with regard to addressing in-
equality. For instance, male and female teachers may internalize different gender stereotypes
and thus react differently to low- or high-performing male or female students (Williams and
Ceci, 2015), or students may internalize different gender stereotypes and thus be more or
less receptive to teaching from teachers of a particular gender (Ouazad and Page, 2012).
In this chapter, I address this question by studying how the effect of assignment to a
female teacher changes with both the gender and ability of a student, using data from a
field experiment conducted to evaluate the Teach for America (TFA) Program. I estimate
the Conditional Average Treatment Effect (CATE) of assignment to a female teacher, con-
ditioning on student gender and on pre-treatment test score as a proxy for ability. The
CATE parameter is ideal for this study because it is a policy-relevant parameter that di-
rectly addresses the question of how student ability changes the effect of teacher gender on
student outcomes. My estimates show how the effect of being assigned to a female teacher
changes with both student gender and student ability.
Exploiting random assignment of students to teachers in the data allows me to deploy
non-parametric techniques that require the strong assumption of unconfoundedness rather
than imposing functional form restrictions. While the data is not representative of the U.S.
primary school student population overall, it is representative of the most disadvantaged
students and schools - a subset of particular importance to policymakers. Students in these
schools are less likely to continue on to higher education, and thus more likely to face the
challenges facing individuals without a college education in modern society1.
1Men with less than a four-year college education have seen a dramatic reduction in real income over the
last decade (Autor and Wasserman, 2013), are less likely to enter the labor force (Krueger, 2017), and face
increased risk of poverty, physical health problems, and mental health problems. The prospects for women
with less than a four-year college education are significantly worse than for women with more education, but
are less grim than those for men.
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I find very limited heterogeneity in the effect of teacher gender on students with different
levels of prior achievement. For male students, assignment to a female teacher has a nearly
uniform positive impact on math test scores. In reading, there is a small positive relationship
between student ability and the effect of assignment to a female teacher. For female students,
there is notably more heterogeneity in the effect of teacher gender. In math, there is a
stronger positive relationship between ability and the effect of teacher gender than for male
students, and some indication that the lowest-performing female students might be harmed
by assignment to a female teacher. In reading, there is a non-monotonic relationship between
student ability and the effect of teacher gender.
My results echo much of the previous economics literature in finding no significant
average effect of teacher gender on students. Outside of the bottom of the pre-treatment
test score distribution, the effect of assignment to a female teacher does not significantly
differ with student gender. At the very bottom of that distribution, female students may
benefit less than male students from assignment to female teachers in math. Notably, for
all students, the effect of assignment to a female teacher is either positive or insignificant,
which suggests that biases such as those found by Lavy (2008), Terrier (2016), or Cappelen
et al. (2019) are not present in primary school.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related lit-
erature. Section 3.3 discusses the data, the institutional background, and the experiment
itself. Section 3.4 briefly introduces the theoretical framework for the CATE estimator and
sets out my estimation strategy. Section 3.5 presents the main results. Section 3.6 considers
possible mechanisms and policy implications. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
In this chapter I contribute directly to the literature that studies student/teacher dy-
namics based on demographic features, and indirectly to a related strand of literature that
considers the underlying mechanisms.
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Reduced form estimates of the effect of demographic matching between students and
teachers go back to Ehrenberg et al. (1995), who found that demographic matching had
little impact on student learning, but a significant impact on teacher perceptions of stu-
dents, using NELS:882 data. Dee (2004) used Project STAR data to investigate the effect of
teacher race on students, finding a positive effect of same-race teachers on math and reading
for students. Dee (2005) exploited a unique feature of the NELS:88 data to control for stu-
dent fixed effects, again finding that student/teacher demographic dynamics had significant
effects on teacher perceptions. Dee (2007), restricting attention to gender dynamics, found
that assignment to a same-gender teacher significantly improved student test scores, teacher
perceptions of the student, and student engagement.
Tertiary education has also received significant attention. Bettinger and Long (2005) and
Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009) studied the effect of instructor gender on undergraduate
students using administrative data from different universities3. Hoffmann and Oreopoulos
(2009) found that assignment to a same-sex instructor boosted relative student performance
and likelihood of course completion, but had little impact on upper-year course selection.
Bettinger and Long (2005) found very mixed results - their primary conclusion is that
the effect of instructor gender changes dramatically based on the subject in question. For
instance, they found strong positive effects on female students in math and statistics, and
a weak effect in economics. They also add to the growing number of studies that find
negligible effects of instructor gender on male students.
Carrell et al. (2010), exploiting random assignment of students to teachers at the U.S.
Air Force Academy, found limited impacts of instructor gender on male students, but sig-
nificant positive impacts on female students in math and science. In contrast to Hoffmann
and Oreopoulos (2009), Carrell et al. (2010) finds significant impacts for upper-year course
selection. Fairlie et al. (2014), using administrative data from a community college, found
2The National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 consists of a representative sample of students
that were in 8th grade in 1988.
3Bettinger and Long (2005) uses data on full-time undergraduate students in Ohio during 1998 and 1999.
Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009) uses data on students at the University of Toronto.
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similar effects for instructor race - in particular, assignment to an instructor from an un-
derrepresented minority group shrinks the performance gap between white and minority
students.
In postgraduate education, Neumark and Gardecki (1998) found that job placement
outcomes for female graduate students in economics were not significantly impacted by
the addition of female faculty members or having a female dissertation chair, while finding
limited evidence for positive effects on graduation time and graduation likelihood. Hilmer
and Hilmer (2007) studied top-30 economics doctoral programs between 1990 and 1994,
and found that female students with male advisors were significantly more likely to accept
a research-oriented first job, but found little effect on early career publication success.
In recent years, some large additional datasets have become available to researchers.
Egalite et al. (2015) uses administrative from the Florida public school system to find small
but significant effects of teacher race/ethnicity on students. Winters et al. (2013), also using
Florida public school data, find that assignment to a female teacher positively impacts both
male and female students in math, primarily between the 6th and 10th grade levels.
One implication of this is that teacher gender may not have an effect on student outcomes
before middle school. However, there remains some uncertainty about when children begin
to understand or internalize gender stereotypes. Ambady et al. (2001) suggests that it
begins around 10 years of age, while Steele (2003) finds evidence suggesting that it begins
as early as 7 years of age. Antecol et al. (2015), using the same data as I use here, finds
that female teachers have a negative impact on female students in math, and no impact
elsewhere. They offer suggestive evidence that the underlying mechanism is math anxiety
among female teachers.
The mechanisms underlying student/teacher gender or race dynamics remain an area
of ongoing research. One of the most commonly proposed theories is that teachers serve
as role models for demographically similar students (Hess and L. Leal, 1997), potentially
increasing student motivation and ambition (Maria Villegas et al., 2012), or reducing the
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effect of stereotype threat4 (Steele, 1997; Beilock et al., 2010). An alternative theory is that
demographic dynamics affect teacher expectations of students, and that these expectations
have material influence on relevant student outcomes. Prior research has found that teacher
expectations are influenced by demographic matching (Ouazad and Page, 2012; Ouazad,
2014; Gershenson et al., 2016). The impact of teacher expectations on students appears to
be largely uncontroversial, but Mechtenberg (2009) develops a model of cheap-talk grading
that generates the same kind of achievement gaps observed empirically.
Finally, it could be that teachers are less likely to exhibit biases against demographically
similar students, either directly through biased grading behavior (Terrier, 2016; Lavy, 2008;
Lavy and Sand, 2018) or through moderated responses to student misbehavior (Downey
and Pribesh, 2004; Holt and Gershenson, 2017).
Ouazad and Page (2012) offers suggestive evidence that the effect of teacher gender
on students may depend on the students as well. In an experiment designed to elicit
student beliefs about teacher biases, they found that male students correctly expected
female teachers to be biased against them, while female students incorrectly expected male
teachers to be biased in their own favor.
Pinning down the active mechanisms is a significant empirical challenge. The data
necessary to distinguish between different mechanisms is difficult to acquire. For instance,
determining whether teachers demonstrate biases in grading behavior requires access to
both teacher grades and anonymous grades, as in Lavy (2008), Terrier (2016), or Lavy and
Sand (2018). Carlana (2019) uses the Gender-Science Implicit Association Test to measure
teacher biases directly, and finds that biased teachers increase the gender gap in math
performance in their classes. Bassi et al. (2018), using video of teachers in Chilean schools,
finds that teachers pay more attention to, and interact more favorably with, boys than with
girls. This ‘attention gap’ is correlated with the gender gap in math scores in Chile.
4Stereotype threat posits that when an individual feels that they run the risk of confirming stereotypes
about their social group, they become more anxious about their performance, and this may hinder their
performance at a particular task.
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 The National Evaluation of Teach for America
The data comes from the Mathematica Policy Research, Inc (MPR) National Evaluation
of Teach for America (NETFA) Public Use File5. The NETFA was a field experiment
conducted in elementary schools from six regions of the United States between 2001 and
2003. The full study consists of a pilot study, conducted in Baltimore during the 2001-2002
academic year, and a follow-up full-scale study conducted in Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston,
New Orleans, and the Mississippi Delta during the 2002-2003 academic year. In total, 17
schools containing 98 classes and 1,938 students took part in the experiment.
In each region, schools that had at least one TFA teacher and at least one non-TFA
teacher assigned to teach a class in the same grade were considered ‘eligible’ for the experi-
ment. From the pool of eligible school-grade combinations, MPR selected a random sample
to form an experimental group that was representative of the schools where TFA teachers
tended to teach at the time6. If a school-grade combination was selected for inclusion in the
experiment, students entering that school and grade were randomly assigned to the teachers
allocated to that school and grade. Throughout the experimental year, MPR performed
roster checks to enforce original classroom assignments.
After the random assignment to classrooms, students in experimental classrooms took
math and reading tests based on the last school grade they had completed, which I will
refer to as pre-treatment tests. At the end of the school year, students again took math and
reading tests based on the school grade they had just completed. For the vast majority of
the students in the sample, the pre- and post-treatment tests were the grade-appropriate
Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS). A small group of students took their tests in Spanish -
for these students, the test was the Logramos test. Both tests are published by the same
organization (Riverside Publishing), but are normed relative to different groups.
5https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/-/media/publications/data-sets/2017/tfapublicuse.zip
6The Teach for America program has expanded significantly since the experiment. The sample is likely
not representative of ‘TFA schools’ today.
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The original purpose of the NETFA experiment was to evaluate the effectiveness of the
Teach for America program. As a result, the sample is not representative of the U.S. school
population - it is representative of the schools that usually participate in the TFA program.
While this prevents my results from generalizing to the broader school population, the stu-
dents served by these schools are a subset of the student population on which policymakers
have focused in the past.
3.3.2 Sample Statistics
The NETFA data includes detailed information on student and teacher characteris-
tics. For students, it includes class type (bilingual/monolingual), student demographic
characteristics, class size, and math/reading scores both before and after treatment. For
teachers, it includes demographic characteristics, type of teacher certification (nontradi-
tional/traditional), and years of experience7. In addition to the baseline data, I construct
a classroom-level indicator variable for the presence of at least one disruptive student8.
The test score variables deserve some further discussion. The data does not contain tra-
ditional test scores. Instead, there are raw counts for number of correctly answered questions
and number of questions attempted, and a battery of transformed scores. The transformed
scores include standardized score, grade equivalent, national percentile rank, and normal
curve equivalent scores. For my investigation, I use normal curve equivalent scores as both
pre-treatment conditioning and post-treatment outcome variables. The primary reason for
this choice is that normal curve equivalent scores have the same equal-interval property
that a z-score does. This is critical for estimation techniques that average outcomes.
7Seven classrooms experienced teacher turnover during the experimental year. Following Antecol et al.
(2015), I code the teacher as being the first teacher without missing data. In all but one case, this is
equivalent to the longest-serving teacher.
8I use disciplinary data to proxy for this. Specifically, if a class contained at least one student who was
suspended or expelled during the course of the school year, I code that classroom as having been disrupted.
Some classes contained students that are not part of the research sample, so some classes may be incorrectly
coded as not disrupted.
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Normal curve equivalent (NCE) scores are defined NCE = 50 + 21.063 ∗ ss where ss is
the standard z-score. The choice of 21.063 as the multiplier ensures that, if the underlying
standard scores are normally distributed, then a percentile rank of 1, 50, or 99 corresponds
to a normal curve equivalent score of 1, 50, or 99 respectively. Close to 50, normal curve
equivalent scores change more slowly than percentile ranks, while close to 1 or 99, they
change more rapidly9.
Some students in the sample have raw scores of 99. These scores are invalid - the
highest possible raw score in the sample is 44 in reading and 50 in math (Penner, 2016).
Approximately 19 (21) percent of the initial math (reading) sample is lost due to students
with missing or invalid data. This is a slightly larger loss than Antecol et al. (2015) because
they retained invalid test scores in their main specification10.
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for the variables of interest. Note that the math
estimation sample and the reading estimation sample are not identical. In general, this
is because students who recorded an invalid test score in math or reading did not always
record an invalid test score in both subjects. In the interests of dropping as little data as
possible, I retain students with invalid test scores in the ‘wrong’ subject when estimating
the CATE for math or reading outcomes.
Table 3.2 reports the results of tests for mean differences between the full sample and
the two estimation samples. I find very similar results to Antecol et al. (2015) in these tests.
Sample attrition appears to be largely at random.
While there are some significant differences in means between the full and estimation
samples, most are quantitatively small. The only exceptions are in pre-treatment math and
reading scores - and this is entirely due to the removal of invalid test scores11.
9If the underlying test scores are normally distributed, a percentile rank between 89 and 95 will be
transformed into a normal curve equivalent between 75.8 and 84.6. A percentile rank between 40 and 59
will be transformed into a normal curve equivalent between 44.7 and 54.8.
10In a supplementary specification, Antecol et al. (2015) removed the invalid scores and did not see a large
change in their results.
11Invalid raw scores of 99 were coded as normal curve equivalent scores of 0. Thus, removal of invalid
scores will mechanically drive mean pre-treatment test scores up. The full-sample mean pre-treatment scores
after removing invalid scores are essentially identical to the estimation sample means.
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Contrasting the estimation samples with only those students who have invalid test scores
tells a somewhat different story. Black students are slightly more likely than average to have
recorded an invalid math score, while being slightly less likely to record an invalid reading
score. Hispanic students display the reverse pattern - they are slightly more likely to record
an invalid reading score, and less likely to record an invalid math score. Finally, there is a
statistically significant difference in the mean class size between the math estimation sample
and the sample of students with invalid math scores. This is likely because larger classes
have more chances to draw an invalid score, rather than there being a causal relationship
between class size and invalid scores.
Since I will be estimating treatment effects conditional on pre-treatment test scores, it is
worth looking at the distribution of those scores in the data. Figure 3.1 presents histograms
of the pre-treatment math and reading scores across the relevant estimation samples. The
red dashed line indicates the 90th quantile of the pre-treatment test score distribution for
each sample.
Figure 3.1 Pre-Treatment Test Score Distribution
Since I will be estimating treatment effects conditional on pre-treatment test scores, the
relative lack of data in the upper half of the pre-treatment test score distribution has a
direct impact on the variance of my estimates.
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3.4 Estimation Strategy
Capturing the heterogeneity of a treatment effect has traditionally been done through
the estimation of quantile treatment effects (QTEs), which describe the difference between
quantiles of the outcome distribution for untreated and treated individuals. QTE esti-
mation, however, allows for heterogeneity in the treatment effect across sub-populations
that are not identifiable given covariates. For example, the QTE of assignment to a female
teacher might be positive for students in the 60th quantile, negative for students in the 40th
quantile, and zero for those in the 50th quantile - but it may not be possible to determine
a priori whether a particular student was in any of those quantiles. In the context of my
investigation, this is undesirable - I am interested in how the treatment effect of assignment
to a female teacher changes with specific covariates (gender and pre-treatment test scores).
Thus, instead of the QTE, I estimate the Conditional Average Treatment Effect (CATE)
function. The CATE is defined as the value of the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) within
a sub-population defined by specific covariate values. While the CATE is not an entirely
new parameter, often appearing as an intermediate estimand for ATE estimation (Heckman
et al., 1997; Hahn, 1998), treatment of the CATE as a parameter of interest is relatively
recent.
The chief difficulty in identifying the CATE is that unconfoundedness probably does not
hold when conditioning on a strict subset of the available covariates. In the context of this
investigation, it is unlikely that unconfoundedness holds conditional on only student gender
and pre-treatment test scores. Abrevaya et al. (2015) provides a semi-parametric estimation
procedure that accounts for this issue and allows for consistent estimation of the CATE
parameter when conditioning on a subset of the covariates for which unconfoundedness
does not hold.
I implement the Abrevaya et al. (2015) estimator and estimate the CATE of assignment
to a female teacher. I condition on pre-treatment test scores after splitting the sample by
student gender, recovering the CATE conditional on both covariates.
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3.4.1 The Abrevaya et al. (2015) CATE Estimator
For compactness of notation, let Yi be the post-treatment test score for student i, Xi
be a vector of control covariates, and Di be a binary indicator for the gender of student i’s
teacher (Di = 1 if i was assigned to a female teacher, Di = 0 otherwise). Let X1i be a strict
subset of Xi, containing only i’s pre-treatment test score and an indicator for i’s gender.
Formally, the CATE is defined as
τ(x1) = E [Yi(1)− Yi(0) | X1 = x1] (3.1)
This parameter captures how the average treatment effect E [Yi(1)− Yi(0)] depends on the
covariates contained in X1 - in this context, how the effect of assignment to a female
teacher changes with student gender and pre-treatment test scores. The Abrevaya et al.
(2015) estimator of the CATE is
τ̂(x1) =
1
nhl
∑n
i=1
(
DiYi
p̂(Xi)
− (1−Di)Yi1−p̂(Xi)
)
K1
(
X1i−x1
h1
)
1
nhl
∑n
i=1K1
(
X1i−x1
h1
) (3.2)
where K1(·) and h1 are respectively a kernel function and a bandwidth, l is the dimension
of the vector X1 (in this case, l = 1 because I condition on gender by splitting the sample,
leaving only pre-treatment test score in X1), and p̂(Xi) is an estimate of the propensity
score12. Subject to mild regularity conditions on the first-stage propensity score estima-
tion, Abrevaya et al. (2015) show that this estimator is asymptotically consistent for the
CATE under the familiar unconfoundedness and sampling assumptions necessary for ATE
estimation.
3.4.2 Identification Strategy
Intuitively, the identifying assumptions require that students who are assigned to a
female teacher are comparable to students assigned to male teachers, conditional on pre-
12Abrevaya et al. (2015) considers both parametric and nonparametric estimation of the propensity score,
and provides consistency results for both cases. While the nonparametric approach offers potential efficiency
gains, it requires complicated transformations of discrete variables. In addition, it quickly runs into the curse
of dimensionality when the set of covariates is of high dimension. As a result, I estimate the propensity
score parametrically.
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treatment test scores, student gender, and other covariates. If, for instance, students in one
region had much stronger gender stereotypes and were also more likely to be assigned to a
female teacher, unconfoundedness would likely fail. Without controlling for region effects
in the estimation, the estimated effect of assignment to a female teacher would be biased
downwards.
A major upside of the data used is that conditional on randomization block, students
were assigned to teachers totally at random. This means that a number of potential con-
founders, like better students being assigned to female teachers13, are not concerns. How-
ever, since the randomization is not unconditional, some potential sources of confounding
remain. In particular, while students were randomly assigned to teachers, teachers were
not randomly assigned to preparation pathways (i.e. TFA and non-TFA teachers are likely
to be different), nor were they randomly assigned to schools or grades (i.e. it may be that
teachers in one school are different from those in another school).
For TFA teachers, dealing with these issues is straightforward. TFA applicants in the
experiment provided regional preferences, which allows for teachers to differ across regions,
but not across schools within a region14.
For non-TFA teachers, non-random assignment of teachers to schools or grades poses
a more difficult problem. It is certainly possible that non-TFA teachers could select into
different schools (or even grades) within a region, which would not be adequately controlled
by a region indicator. However, it is hard to see why teachers would select differentially into
schools within the population from which the sample was drawn. While teachers almost
certainly select into or out of high-poverty schools, it is less clear that they select into
different schools within the population of high-poverty schools - outside of simple geographic
reasons, which are adequately controlled for by region indicators.
13Clotfelter et al. (2006) finds that male teachers are more likely to be assigned students with lower math
and reading scores, so this would be a real concern with purely observational data.
14To be more specific, TFA applicants reported regional preferences as well as preferences for level of
education (e.g. primary/middle/high school levels). Since the experiment considers only primary school
students, the latter preferences cannot introduce confounding. I thank the TFA administrators for a thorough
explanation of the application process at the time of the experiment.
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This would seem to suggest that the propensity score should be estimated as a function
of region indicators (and perhaps school/grade indicators). However, this goes too far
towards treating the data as coming from a perfectly randomized experiment. Notably,
some schools in the sample have no male teachers - using school indicators when estimating
the propensity score would result in students from those schools having estimated propensity
scores of either 0 or 1, which is far from credible. Even if there is differential selection of
teachers into schools, it is very difficult to see how it could produce certain schools that
would never have male teachers. The existence of schools with only female teachers is far
more likely to be a result of the relative proportion of female primary school teachers in
general, rather than evidence of a strong selection mechanism that eliminates male teachers
entirely from some schools.
Additionally, for the purpose of estimating treatment effects, the goal of the propen-
sity score estimation step is “to obtain estimates of the propensity score that balance the
covariates between treated and control samples” (Imbens and Rubin, 2015). In finite sam-
ples15 it is thus important to include not only covariates that potentially explain treatment
assignment, but covariates that explain the outcome of interest - even if they are known
not to play a role in treatment assignment. I thus estimate the propensity score with the
following logistic regression:
ln
P (FTEACHi = 1)
1− P (FTEACHi = 1)
= β0 + β1SC
′
i + β2TC
′
i + β3R
′
i + β4TFAi + β5CSi + ui (3.3)
where FTEACHi is an indicator for assignment to a female teacher, SC
′
is a vector of
student covariates, TC
′
is a vector of teacher characteristics, R
′
is a vector of region dummy
variables, TFA is an indicator for whether the teacher was a TFA teacher or not, and CSi
is the size of student i’s class. Full details of this specification can be found in chapter A3,
where I also consider some alternative specifications for the propensity score.
15With a sufficiently large sample, correctly specifying the propensity score model suffices to achieve
covariate balance. However, in any finite sample, even one from a perfectly randomized experiment, there
is no guarantee that weighting by the true propensity score will balance important covariates.
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One potential issue facing any investigation that uses inverse probability weighting is
the effect of very large or very small propensity scores. It is clear from equation (2) that if
p̂(Xi) is very close to 0 (1) for treated (untreated) students, the importance of the outcomes
for those students will be inflated significantly by the weighting procedure. Weights such as
these lead to highly variable estimates, and may indicate a failure of the overlap condition.
In the above specification, this is not a significant issue. To deal with the minority of
students with extreme propensity scores, I set propensity scores above 0.95 (below 0.05) to
0.95 (0.05). The main specification is robust to different trimming behavior - in particular,
dropping students with extreme propensity scores instead of changing their propensity scores
does not have a noticeable effect on the results. One alternative specification, discussed in
chapter A3, depends more strongly on trimming behavior.
3.4.3 Choice of Smoothing Parameters
The IPW-based estimator in (3.2) requires the choice of two smoothing parameters -
the kernel and the bandwidth. Following Abrevaya et al. (2015), I set bandwidth to be
a multiple of the sample standard deviation in the conditioning covariate (pre-treatment
test score). In my main specification, the bandwidth is set to be half the sample standard
deviation (approximately 9 for male students in math, for example). I use a Gaussian
kernel:
Kg(u) =
1√
2π
e−
1
2
u2 (3.4)
In chapter A3, I report results for different bandwidths and kernels. As is often the case with
kernel-based local averaging, bandwidth choice strongly influences the resulting estimates,
while kernel choice generally does not have a strong effect. Smaller bandwidths produce
more variable CATE estimates, which are often non-monotonic and can have extreme ranges.
Larger bandwidths produce flatter CATE estimates, and mechanically force the estimated
CATE function towards monotonicity. As bandwidth increases, the CATE estimator quickly
becomes uninformative as to heterogeneity, essentially recovering an estimate of the ATE.
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While overfitting is a valid concern, my main goal is not to provide another estimate of
the average effect of teacher gender. Heterogeneity in that effect is my primary concern, and
I thus err on the side of choosing a bandwidth that is too small for my main specification.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Conditioning on Pre-Treatment Test Score
Figure 3.2 depicts the estimated CATE function for female students. Post-treatment
math test scores are the outcome of interest, and the conditioning covariate is the student’s
pre-treatment normal curve equivalent test score in math. Pointwise valid confidence inter-
vals are constructed using the asymptotic approximations from Abrevaya et al. (2015)16.
As one would expect, given the distribution of pre-treatment test scores in the sample (Fig-
Figure 3.2 CATE (Math) for female students
16To the best of my knowledge, construction of uniformly valid confidence intervals for the Abrevaya et al.
(2015) estimator is an open problem.
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ure 3.1), the size of the confidence intervals grows rapidly once the pre-test score exceeds
approximately 50, due to lack of data. Notably, the confidence interval for a pre-test score
of 1 is relatively small, despite being a boundary point. This is largely due to the significant
mass of students scoring 1 on the pre-test (also seen in Figure 3.1).
For the majority of students in this sample, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the true
effect of being assigned a female teacher is zero. Indeed, while the confidence intervals here
are pointwise valid, it is likely that uniformly valid confidence bands would be wider, and
might not reject the hypothesis that the true effect of assignment to a female teacher is a
constant zero across the pre-treatment test score distribution.
Qualitatively, while the majority of the point estimates are insignificant, the confidence
intervals themselves suggest that if the true effect is not zero, female students at the very
bottom of the ability distribution in math see less benefit from assignment to a female
teacher than female students of higher ability. Outside of the very bottom of the ability
distribution, there does not appear to be much, if any, heterogeneity in the effect of teacher
gender on math test scores for female students. My results are reasonably consistent with
the true CATE having a monotonic relationship between pre-test scores and the treatment
effect. Indeed, particularly for TFA teachers, a possible conjecture is that students with
higher ability are easier to teach effectively17.
The implied average treatment effect18 is around 0.25 standard deviations, or 4.5 points
on the normal curve equivalent scale. While this is quite high, especially in comparison to
Antecol et al. (2015), note that formally assessing the statistical significance of the implied
ATE remains an open question. In light of the confidence intervals and the size of the implied
ATE, it seems unlikely that the implied ATE would be statistically significant19. Restraining
17Since TFA is a highly selective program and primarily accepts the highest-achieving applicants, it is
likely that those applicants were high-achievement students in primary school as well. Since they receive
a relatively small amount of accelerated training in teaching, they may have an easier time understanding
the difficulties faced by high-achieving students in their classrooms while struggling to understand those
difficulties faced by the lowest ability students.
18The implied ATE is calculating by taking a weighted average of the CATE point estimates, where the
weight on τ̂(x1) is equal the proportion of the sample with X1 = x1. It is the point estimate of the average
treatment effect we would expect to see if the CATE point estimates are correct.
19I performed a standard non-parametric bootstrap for the implied ATE, and subject to the caveat that
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the calculation to consider only point estimates below 55, thus excluding potentially extreme
point estimates driven by lack of data, the implied ATE decreases to around 0.19 standard
deviations (3.4 on the normal curve scale).
Figure 3.3 depicts the estimated CATE function for male students, again with math
scores as the outcome of interest and conditioning covariate. The increase in the size of the
confidence intervals starts earlier than in Figure 3.2, primarily because the male pre-test
score distribution is skewed to the left relative to the full sample, which is in line with male
students generally performing worse than female students in school. In addition, since no
male in the sample scored higher than 92 on the pre-test, CATE estimates for pre-treatment
test scores above 92 cannot be constructed.
Figure 3.3 CATE (Math) for male students
In contrast to Figure 3.2, for the majority of the students in this sample the effect of
assignment to a female teacher is at least marginally significant and positive. This is in
such a procedure is not currently known to be valid, the bootstrap results support this claim.
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stark contrast to what one would expect if female teachers were biased against low-ability
male students. If anything, my results so far would be consistent with a bias in the opposite
direction - against low-performing or low-ability female students.
The implied ATE is approximately 0.25 standard deviations (4.7 on the normal curve
scale). Considering only pre-test scores below 55 raises the implied ATE significantly to
0.33 standard deviations (6.0 on the normal curve scale). As before, it seems unlikely that
the implied ATE would be statistically significant. Using the same rough rule of thumb
that uniformly valid confidence bands would be larger, it is also unlikely that I would be
able to reject the hypothesis that the true effect was a constant zero.
It is notable that, discounting the extreme point estimates arising from lack of data at
the very top of the pre-treatment test score distribution, there is essentially no evidence of
heterogeneity in the effect of teacher gender on male students. A male who scored 1 on the
pre-test has nearly the same estimated CATE as one who recorded a score between 2 and
55. The only change is an increase in the size of the confidence intervals, which may be
entirely due to the decrease in available data as test scores increase. The size of the positive
effect is roughly the same as for female students in the middle of the pre-treatment test
score distribution.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 depict the estimated CATE functions for female and male students,
respectively, with reading test scores as the outcome of interest and conditioning covariate.
The first-stage propensity score model is the same as before except for the change from
math to reading test score variables. For female students, there is noticeably
more heterogeneity in the estimated CATE function, and it is no longer consistent with
a monotonic relationship between treatment effects and pre-treatment test scores. The
implied ATE is around 0.09 standard deviations (1.7 on the normal curve scale). A much
smaller effect on reading than in math is consistent with previous literature studying the
effect of teacher gender. Restricting attention to pre-test scores below 55 has almost no
impact on the implied ATE. In contrast to previous literature suggesting that effects on
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Figure 3.4 CATE (Reading) for female students
reading are non-existent, I find that female students with pre-treatment test scores in the
middle of the distribution see a significant and large positive treatment effect.
For male students, the story appears largely the same as before. There is limited het-
erogeneity (although potentially more than in math). The estimated CATE is positive for
almost all pre-treatment test scores below 55, as before, and the change in the CATE within
that range is limited. As was the case with math results, the implied ATE for male students
is relatively large - approximately 0.31 standard deviations (5.5 on the normal curve scale)
for the full sample, and around 0.29 standard deviations (5.2) for students scoring less than
55 on the pre-test. Again, it is unlikely that the implied ATE is statistically significant.
3.5.2 Conditioning on Class Rank
To this point, I have been agnostic as to what might drive heterogeneity in the effect of
teacher gender. Most of the standard mechanisms for teacher gender effects could plausibly
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Figure 3.5 CATE (Reading) for male students
include heterogeneity on ability. Role model effects, for instance, might be stronger for
high-ability students, or stereotype threat effects on women in math may be more powerful
at the low end of the ability distribution. However, it is also possible that teacher behavior
differs for students of different perceived ability - e.g. teachers may invest different amounts
of effort in students they perceive as struggling or excelling.
Perceived ability may not closely track ‘objective’ ability as measured by pre-treatment
test scores, or it may be that teachers care more about the ability of a student relative
to the rest of the class, rather than relative to a national norm group. To investigate this
possibility, I estimate the CATE functions as before, but replace the pre-treatment test score
with a class rank variable constructed from the data20. Figure 3.6 presents the estimated
CATE functions conditional on class rank for the four subsamples.
20Unfortunately, since some classes contain students not in the research sample, the accuracy of this
variable is likely imperfect. If there is a correlation between student ability and whether a student was in
the research sample, identification of the CATE may fail for this specification.
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Figure 3.6 Conditioning on Class Rank
The class rank variable is scaled into a ‘percentile’ rank, with 0 being the worst student
in the class and higher values reflecting higher within-class rankings, so the interpretation of
the graphs is similar to before - and the results suggest that within-class performance is not
correlated with the size of the teacher gender effect. Even with point-wise valid confidence
bands, the hypothesis that the true effect conditional on class rank is a constant zero cannot
be rejected in any sub-sample at the 95% level.
3.6 Discussion
Somewhat surprisingly, the overriding takeaway from this investigation is that there is
very little heterogeneity in the effect of teacher gender on students of different levels of
ability. Assignment to a female teacher is either neutral or positive for all students, and the
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heterogeneity is largely confined to the different effects for male and female students. In
math, male students see a uniformly positive effect from assignment to a female teacher, as
do female students outside of the very bottom of the pre-treatment test score distribution.
In reading, I find that students of either gender with pre-treatment test scores that are
average compared to the national norm see positive effects from assignment to a female
teacher, and the remainder of students see no significant effect.
The presence of significant effects on reading is surprising in light of the existing lit-
erature. It may be that, for relatively well prepared students, female teachers are more
effective in teaching reading because they have internalized stereotypes labeling reading as
an area where women are better. It may also be the students who have internalized such a
stereotype, and exert more effort or are more engaged in reading when taught by a woman.
Differential teacher behavior could also explain why I find a positive effect on male
students in math, but no significant effect for female students. Female teachers who view
math as a ‘male’ subject might view low achievement from a male student as a sign that help
is needed, while viewing low achievement in math from a female student as being expected.
Unlike with the reading effects, it is difficult to see how traditional gender stereotypes about
math might drive male students to be more engaged when taught by women.
In terms of policy implications, the most important implication is that male students
benefit from assignment to female teachers, while female students appear largely unaffected.
Primary school teaching is already an occupation dominated by women, and my results
suggest that, if anything, this has benefited male students.
Since classes are generally not split by gender, consideration of teacher gender when
assigning teachers to classes is unlikely to generate benefits overall. That said, Clotfelter
et al. (2006) finds that male teachers are more likely to be assigned to classes with lower
average math and reading scores. This kind of sorting is likely to have a negative overall
effect on student achievement - while the very worst-performing female students might
benefit from assignment to a male teacher, my results suggest that male students will
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be harmed, and female students with higher scores may also be harmed relative to being
assigned a female teacher. If anything, my results suggest that, all else equal, women should
be preferred when seeking a teacher for a classroom of low-achieving students.
In terms of average effects, my results differ from those of Antecol et al. (2015), who
find a negative association between assignment to a female teacher and a female student’s
test scores in math. Partially, this is due to consideration of different parameters. Antecol
et al. (2015) consider estimates of what can be thought of as the effect of being a female
student, and how that changes with teacher gender. In their specification, the estimated
effect of being assigned to a female teacher is insignificant at conventional levels for all
students, which is at least somewhat consistent with my results. More generally, the relative
treatment effects for male and female students display the same relationship - males benefit
more (or are harmed less) by assignment to a female teacher. Antecol et al. (2015) also
provide suggestive evidence that the mechanism underlying their results is powered by
stereotype threat, which falls in line with the hypothesis of differential teacher behavior
proposed above.
As my sample is not representative of the U.S. student and teacher populations, it is
possible that my results are driven by the difference between the population of disadvantaged
schools and the broader U.S. school population. It is plausible, for instance, that teachers
working in the most disadvantaged schools are less likely to be biased against (or more aware
of their potential biases against) low-ability students. They may receive specialized training
to help them effectively teach low-ability students that a teacher in a less disadvantaged
school would not receive. The level of schooling may also play a role, as my sample consists
entirely of primary school students between first and fifth grade. This may be too early
for gender stereotypes to strongly affect gender dynamics between students and teachers,
although Antecol et al. (2015) suggests otherwise. Different levels of schooling, and a sample
more representative of the U.S. school population overall, provide exciting avenues to extend
this research.
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3.7 Conclusion
I estimate the Conditional Average Treatment Effect of assignment to a female teacher
on students of different abilities, using data from the National Evaluation of Teach for Amer-
ica, a field experiment run between 2001 and 2003. I find little evidence of heterogeneity
across students of different abilities, and a small degree of heterogeneity across students of
different genders. Male students see a uniformly positive but marginally significant effect
from being assigned to a female teacher in math, while female students see effects that are
generally insignificant. In reading, students that are average relative to the national norm
group see positive and significant effects from assignment to a female teacher, while the
remainder of students see insignificant effects.
Overall, my results suggest that teacher gender effects in math do not significantly
change with student ability, with what little heterogeneity there is being primarily on the
gender axis. In reading, there is some evidence of heterogeneity along the ability axis, but
much less difference between students of different genders. My results are most consistent
with teachers internalizing traditional gender stereotypes regarding math and reading, and
not at all consistent with the bias found in Cappelen et al. (2019).
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Table 3.2 Mean Differences between Full and Estimation Samples
Full vs Math Estimation Full vs Reading Estimation
Student Characteristics
Female -0.003 -0.007
Black 0.015 −0.026∗
Hispanic −0.023∗ 0.021†
Class Size 0.233 −0.096†
Pre-Treatment Math −1.579∗ 0.248
Pre-Treatment Reading −0.720 −1.122∗
Disrupted Class −0.014 −0.024†
Teacher Characteristics
Female −0.005 0.005
Black 0.018 −0.008
Hispanic −0.001 0.010
TFA 0.006 −0.007
Certification −0.024† 0.009
Experience −0.024∗ 0.238
* denotes significance at the 5% level
† denotes significance at the 10% level
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 1
Proof of Bootstrap Failure
Recall that
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(A.1)
Consider each part of the above separately. First,
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where the final step follows because the idiosyncratic errors ei are by definition independent
of each other, and independent of µ(d, x) functions. Now, decompose into
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First, dealing with (25), we need to convert the sum to cover the entire sample. To do so,
note that for control unit j, ej will show up once for each time j ∈ JM(i). By the definition
of Ki, this happens Ki times. Thus,
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RegardingQRN , note that since µ(0, Xi)−µ(0, Xm(i)) is op(N−1/2) it must be that µ(0, Xm(i))−
µ(0, Xi) is also op(N
−1/2), so both terms in QRN are op(N
−1/2), and thus QRN →p 0.
Finally, for Rt∗N , note first that E
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Finally, consider the cross product terms. First, T t∗N R
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Since τ̂ t →p τ t, it follows immediately that
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It is straightforward to verity that Qt∗NR
t∗
N →p 0. The proof is nearly identical. Finally,
consider T t∗Qt∗N ,
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Recalling that Yi(1) = µ(1, Xi) + ei and making the substitution, a number of terms cancel,
leaving
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µ(1, Xi)ei − µ(1, Xi)Ŷi(0)− µ(0, Xi)ei + µ(0, Xi)Ŷi(0)
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Similarly, recall that Ŷi(0) = Ym(i) = µ(0, Xm(i)) + em(i), and make the substitution.
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Note that when I take probability limits, every term involving ei or em(i) goes to zero, so I
will remove them now for convenience.
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Since µ(0, Xi)− µ(0, Xm(i)) is op(N−1/2) when bias correction is unnecessary (Abadie and
Imbens, 2006), T t∗NQt∗N →p 0.
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ATC Simulations
The proposed bootstrap trivially works when estimating the ATC using the Abadie and
Imbens (2008) DGP, as shown in Figure A.1.
Figure A.1 Proposed and Synthetically Corrected Bootstrap (ATC)
The small differences between the proposed and synthetically corrected bootstrap re-
sult from rounding errors when simulating the two procedures. Intuitively, the reason the
procedure works in this case is that ei = Yi − µ(Di, Xi) is uniformly 0 for all treated units,
since Yi(1) has a degenerate distribution. Thus, the value of σ
2(1, Xi) is universally 0, so it
does not matter that the bootstrap incorrectly weights σ2(1, Xi).
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Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that we seek to solve,
min
ki
E
µ(XD1 , 0)− ∑
Di=0
kiYi
2 (B.1)
It is convenient to assume, without loss of generality, that the N0 control units are indexed
by i = 1, ..., N0 and the N1 treated units by i = N0 + 1, ..., N . Thus, in particular,
∑N0
i=1 is
equivalent to
∑
Di=0
. Expanding the square above results in,
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ki
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First, consider the leading squared sum:(
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Since εi is mean-zero and independent of εj , after taking expectations the minimization
problem becomes,
min
ki
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And the solution can be found by solving a system of N0 first order conditions:
2ki
(
µ(Xi, 0)
2 + σ2i
)
+ 2µ(Xi, 0)
∑
j 6=i
kjµ(Xj , 0)− 2µ(Xi, 0)µ(XD1 , 0) = 0 (B.5)
Adopting the convention that a subscript of −i refers to all indices except i, we can re-
arrange to arrive at,
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∑
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(B.6)
Plug this into the first order condition for some l 6= i, to find,
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Note that the index j 6= i includes l, and thus:
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Since t 6= l, i and j 6= l, i describe the same set, this simplifies to,
kl
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Bringing the right-hand side of the above over a common denominator and simplifying gives,
kl
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Doing the same to the left-hand side gives,
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Which allows for a simplified relationship between ki and kj to be found:
kj = kj
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Xi
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(B.11)
Using this relationship delivers,
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Noting that the common denominator on the left-hand side is
∏
j 6=i σ
2
j , this becomes,
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Move the σ2i and σ
2
j terms into the appropriate product operators to produce,
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Finally, note that in the numerator above, the first term can be moved into the summation,
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completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
We seek to solve the same minimization problem, but subject to the constraints that
ki ≥ 0 for all i and
∑N0
i=1 ki = 1. The associated Lagrangian is,
L =
N0∑
i=1
k2i σ
2
i +
(
N0∑
i=1
kiYi
)2
+ µ(XD1 , 0)
2 − 2µ(XD1 , 0)
N0∑
i=1
kiYi − λ
(
N0∑
i=1
ki − 1
)
(B.16)
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and the general first order condition is,
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∂ki
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Using the first-order condition for ki and k1 and solving for the relationship between them
gives,
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Thus:
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From here, it is straightforward to recover,
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Subtracting µ(XD1 , 0) from both sides and simplifying delivers,(
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Substituting this result into the equation for
∑
ki,
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∑N0
i=1
Y 2i
σ2i
+
∑N0
i=1
Y 2i
σ2i
(
Y1
N0∑
i=1
1
σ2i
−
N0∑
i=1
Yi
σ2i
)
(B.22)
Solving the above for k1 produces,
k1 =
1− Y1
∑N0
i=1
Yi
σ2i
+
∑N0
i=1
Y 2i
σ2i
+ µ(XD1 , 0)
(
Y1
∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
−
∑N0
i=1
Yi
σ2i
)
σ21
(∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
+
(∑N0
i=1
Y 2i
σ2i
)(∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
)
−
(∑N0
i=1
Yi
σ2i
)2) (B.23)
And plugging this into the formula for ki, after simplifying,
ki =
1− Y1
∑N0
i=1
Yi
σ2i
+
∑N0
i=1
Y 2i
σ2i
+ µ(XD1 , 0)
(
Y1
∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
−
∑N0
i=1
Yi
σ2i
)
σ2i
(∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
+
(∑N0
i=1
Y 2i
σ2i
)(∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
)
−
(∑N0
i=1
Yi
σ2i
)2)
+
∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
Y1
∑N0
i=1
1
σ2i
−
∑N0
i=1
Yi
σ2i
σ21 (Y1 − Yi)
σ2i
(B.24)
completes the proof of Theorem 2.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose there exist two weight vectors {ki}N0i=1 and {k′i}
N0
i=1. Suppose they differ only
in their final two elements - k′N0−1 = kN0−1 − q, kN0 = 0, and k
′
N0
= q. Consider how the
difference in MSE between these two weight vectors changes with q. The difference in MSE
between {ki}N0i=1 and {k′i}
N0
i=1 is given by
∆MSE = 2qkN0−1σ
2
N0−1 − q
2
(
σ2N0 + σ
2
N0−1
)
− q2
(
µ2N0 + µ
2
N0−1 − 2µN0µN0−1
)
− 2q (µN0 − µN0−1)
N0−2∑
i=1
kiµi + 2qµ(XD1 , 0) (µN0−1 − µN0)
− 2qkN0−1µN0−1 (µN0−1 − µN0) (B.25)
where I have suppressed notation, setting µi = µ(Xi, Di). Minimizing ∆MSE over q
produces the following first order condition:
0 = 2kN0−1σ
2
N0−1 − 2q
(
σ2N0 − σ
2
N0−1
)
− q
(
µ2N0 + µ
2
N0−1 − 2µN0µN0−1
)
− 2 (µN0 − µN0−1)
N0−2∑
i=1
kiµi + 2µ(XD1 , 0) (µN0 − µN0−1)
− 2kN0−1µN0−1 (µN0 − µN0−1) (B.26)
It is straightforward to verify that the second order condition is negative, and in fact ∆MSE
is strictly concave. The solution to the minimization problem is
q∗ =
kN0−1σ
2
N0−1 − (µN0 − µN0−1)
(∑N0−2
i=1 kiµi + kN0−1µN0−1 − µ(XD1 , 0)
)
σ2N0 + σ
2
N0−1 + (µN0 − µN0−1)
2 (B.27)
For convenience, let
∑N0−2
i=1 kiµi + kN0−1µN0−1 − µ(XD1 , 0) = Biaski . It is the bias from
the estimator using the weight vector {ki}N0i=1. Further, let d = (µN0 − µN0−1).
Since the above minimization problem was unconstrained, it is in theory possible for q∗
to be weakly larger than kN0 , which would imply the MSE-minimizing weight vector would
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contain a zero or negative weight. q∗ ≥ kN0−1 implies
kN0−1σ
2
N0−1 − d ·Biaski ≥ (σ
2
N0 + σ
2
N0−1 + d
2)k2
−d
(
N0−1∑
i=1
kiµi − µ(XD1 , 0)
)
≥ σ2N0kN0−1 + d
2kN0−1
Proceeding casewise, suppose that d > 0 and Biaski > 0. This implies that some convex
combination of µi for i ∈ {1, ..., N0−1} is larger in value than the true parameter µ(XD1 , 0),
and that µN0 > µN0−1. Recall that assumption A4 guarantees µ(XD1 , 0) lies between the
largest and smallest values of µi. Suppose the largest value of µi is µj . If j 6= N0, a trivial
MSE decrease can be achieved by shifting some arbitrarily small amount of weight from kj
to kN0 , which would reduce both bias and variance. If j = N0, it must be the case
1 that
some µl > µ(XD1 , 0) and that kl > 0. Thus, again, a trivial MSE decrease could be found
by reducing the weight kl and shifting it to some other unit with µi < µ(XD1 , 0). Thus, if
d > 0 and Biaski > 0, it cannot be that MSE is minimized.
Suppose that d > 0 and Biaski ≤ 0. This implies that µN0 > µN0−1 and that {ki} is an
overestimate of the true parameter. In turn, this trivially implies that an MSE reduction
can be achieved by setting q to some arbitrarily small number, as doing so will reduce both
bias and variance.
Suppose that d < 0 and Biaski > 0. This implies that µN0 < µN0−1 and that {ki}
produces an underestimate of the true parameter. As above, this implies the existence of a
trivial MSE reduction from setting q to some arbitrarily small number.
Finally, suppose that d < 0 and Biaski < 0. Mirroring the first case, this implies that
a MSE decrease can be found by shifting weight between units other than N0 and N0 − 1.
Thus, q∗ ≥ kN0−1 either fails to minimize MSE, or violates assumption A4.
I omit the proof that q∗ < 0, as the proof is nearly identical to the above. One can
proceed casewise to verify that q∗ < 0 implies either a failure to minimize MSE or a violation
of assumption A4.
1Otherwise, if µj > µ(XD1 , 0) and the reverse holds for all other µi, it could not be that Biaski > 0, due
to assumption A4.
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Finally, to verify that q∗ 6= 0, note that q∗ = 0 occurs if and only if kN0−1σ2N0−1 =
d · Biaski . This is entirely possible - but for {ki} to be an MSE-minimizing weight vector,
this must hold for all possible transfers between all possible units. In other words, since N0
has been assigned zero weight, it must hold that
kiσ
2
i = (µN0 − µi)Biaski ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N0 − 1} (B.28)
This is only possible if N0 satisfies either µN0 > µi or µN0 < µi for all i ∈ {1, ..., N0− 1}
- otherwise µN0 − µi would switch signs for at least one such i. Suppose that µN0 > µi
for all i ∈ {1, ..., N0 − 1}. For the above condition to hold, it must be that Biaski is also
positive for all units with positive weight, or µN0 > µi for all i ∈ {1, ..., N0 − 1}.
First, if µ(XD1 , 0) lies below µN0 but above all other µi, it is not possible for Biaski > 0
and kN0 = 0 to hold simultaneously. Thus, there must be some µi > µ(XD1 , 0) which also
satisfies µi < µN0 . Call this unit j. By setting k
′
jµj + k
′
N0
µN0 = kjµj , bias is reduced.
Further, since k′j +k
′
N0
< kj , ‘slack’ is introduced to the weight vector that can be allocated
to some other ki. If σ
2
j and σ
2
N0
are equivalent or if σ2N0 < σ
2
j this change immediately
reduces variance while holding bias constant. If σ2j < σ
2
N0
, setting k′jµj + k
′
N0
µN0 = kjµj
may increase the variance of the estimator. In that case, simply reduce k′N0 and deploy the
additional slack weight to reduce bias. Since there is some positive k′N0 that reduces the
variance of the estimator, it is always possible to find a set of weight shifts that reduces
both bias and variance.
In the alternative case, where µN0 < µi for all i ∈ {1, ..., N0 − 1}, the proof is again
nearly identical, and thus omitted. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
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APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3
Bandwidth Choice
Following Abrevaya et al. (2015), the bandwidth for my estimates was selected as a
multiple of the sample standard deviation in the conditioning covariate. I consider four
different multipliers - 0.25, 0.5, 1, and 2. While the range of these multipliers is much
smaller than that considered by Abrevaya et al. (2015) in their empirical illustration, it will
quickly become clear that even the medium bandwidth of 1 causes the CATE estimator to
over-smooth to the extent that it becomes no more informative than an ATE estimator.
Recall that my main specification sets the bandwidth multiplier to 0.5. Setting the
bandwidth multiplier to 0.25 causes the estimated CATE function to be significantly less
smooth (Figures C.1 and C.2). Qualitatively, however, the story is largely unchanged. The
worst-performing female students see a negative effect of assignment to a female teacher,
while male students see significantly less heterogeneity and no significant negative effects.
The effect of reducing the bandwidth multiplier is nearly identical for reading outcomes.
The qualitative story of the estimated CATE function is largely unchanged - significant
effects are observed in roughly the same places, and the general shape of the function is
similar. Again, there appears to be significantly less heterogeneity for male students than
for female students.
Moving in the other direction and increasing the bandwidth multiplier pushes the es-
timated CATE function strongly towards monotonicity, and towards a flat slope (Figure
C.3). With a bandwidth multiplier of 1, almost every estimated CATE function is strictly
monotonic, and the vast majority of the variation occurs for estimates conditional on the
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Figure C.1 CATE Estimates (Math) with bandwidth = 0.25
Figure C.2 CATE Estimates (Reading) with bandwidth = 0.25
highest test scores, where very little data is available. Given the heterogeneity present
for smaller bandwidths, it seems reasonable to say that at this bandwidth the estimator
is clearly over-smoothing. However, note that even with this bandwidth, female students
still see notably more heterogeneity than male students in reading, although the difference
largely vanishes for math. Increasing the bandwidth multiplier even further to 2 (Figure
C.4), forces near-constancy on almost all estimated CATE functions:
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Figure C.3 CATE Estimates with bandwidth = 1
Kernel Choice
As tends to be the case with kernel-based local averaging estimators, the choice of kernel
does not have a huge impact on the resulting estimates - bandwidth choice is dramatically
more important. I consider two different kernels - the rectangular (uniform) kernel Kr and
the Epanechnikov kernel Ke:
Kr(u) =

1
2 if |u| ≤ 1
0 otherwise
Ke(u) =

3
4
(
1− u2
)
if |u| ≤ 1
0 otherwise
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Figure C.4 CATE Estimates with bandwidth = 2
The primary difference between these kernels and the Gaussian kernel is that weights de-
crease towards zero more rapidly, particularly with the rectangular kernel. This results in
less smooth estimates of the CATE function, but the qualitative story is largely unchanged.
The effect of bandwidth choice is essentially identical for all kernels, so I report only the
results for the intermediate bandwidth multipliers of 0.5 and 1 for these alternative kernels.
The effects of other relatively efficient kernels, such as quartic or triweight kernels, are very
similar to the effect of the Epanechnikov kernel.
Selection of a rectangular kernel (Figure C.5) generates the least smooth estimates for
any given bandwidth. The Epanechnikov kernel (Figure C.6) likewise does not significantly
change the qualitative results.
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Propensity Score Estimation
Details of the main specification
Recall the main specification:
ln
P (FTEACHi = 1)
1− P (FTEACHi = 1)
= β0 + β1SC
′
i + β2TC
′
i + β3R
′
i + β4TFAi + β5CSi + ui
SC
′
i is a vector of student characteristics. It includes indicators for a student being black
or Hispanic, the relevant pre-treatment test score in math or reading as measured on the
normal curve equivalent scale, and an indicator for whether the student’s class contained a
disruptive student.
TC
′
i contains the teacher’s experience measured in years as well as indicators for whether
the teacher was black or Hispanic. In some of the following alternative specifications, it also
includes an indicator for possession of a regular teacher certification.
R
′
is a vector of region indicators. There were 6 regions in the experiment, containing 7
school districts because the Mississippi Delta contributed two school districts. TFAi is an
indicator for whether the teacher was a TFA teacher or not. CSi is the class size, measured
as the number of students in the class at the end of the year1.
Alternative specifications
First, I consider the addition of the indicator for a traditional teacher certification
(Figure C.7). The main specification excludes this variable because previous research (e.g.
Staiger and Rockoff (2010)) suggests that teacher certifications are not good predictors of
teacher quality, and thus balancing of samples on teacher certification would be harmful
unless such balance could be achieved without cost to balance on another covariate (which
is not the case). The results of including teacher certification in the propensity score model
largely bear this claim out - the qualitative story is almost identical, and the only real
1This is the ‘true’ class size in that it counts students that are not part of the research sample.
80
change is an increase in the size of the confidence intervals. This is consistent with the
expected effects of including an irrelevant covariate in the propensity score model.
I omit reports for other bandwidth multipliers because the results of that exercise are
identical - larger confidence bands, with no significant change to the underlying function.
I also consider a much simpler propensity score specification, dropping the teacher and
student demographic variables to leave only pre-test score, class size, teacher experience, and
indicators for disrupted class, assignment to a TFA teacher, and region (Figure C.8). While
this specification clearly excludes potentially relevant covariates, it also results in a complete
elimination of numerically 0 or 1 propensity scores, and far fewer extreme propensity scores.
If the effect of student or teacher demographics is limited, this specification may make a
profitable bias/variance trade-off. In particular, if sorting of teachers into schools was in fact
random, or at least uncorrelated with teacher or school characteristics, this specification
would be preferable.
While the results for male students are very marginally consistent with the results from
my main specification, particularly in math, it is clear that (as prior research would suggest)
the demographic variables excluded in this specification are relevant. If they were irrelevant
or had a sufficiently minor impact on outcomes, one would expect to see smaller confidence
intervals but a largely similar underlying function from this specification.
Finally, I consider the addition of a school fixed effect to the propensity score model
(Figures C.9 and C.10). Since a significant minority of schools contain only female teachers,
this causes the trimming behavior to play a larger part in the results - many more students
receive propensity scores close to 1 or 0 and are thus subject to the trimming behavior.
With my default trimming behavior (setting extreme propensity scores to 0.95 or 0.05), the
results are again reasonably similar in terms of qualitative story.
However, for female students in math and male students in reading, these results are
no longer robust to changes in the trimming behavior. Dropping students with extreme
propensity scores generates the following results
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These results suggest that non-TFA teachers are not sorting differentially into schools
within a region, which was the only potential source of endogeneity in my main specifi-
cation. A conservative reading of these robustness checks would suggest that the positive
treatment effect I find on male students is potentially uncertain, but conclusions related
to the heterogeneity in the effect of teacher gender on students of differing abilities are
unaffected.
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Figure C.5 CATE Estimates with Rectangular Kernel Kr
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Figure C.6 CATE Estimates with Epanechnikov kernel Ke
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Figure C.7 CATE Estimates with Teacher Certification Indicator
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Figure C.8 CATE Estimates without demographics
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Figure C.9 CATE Estimates (Math) with School Fixed Effects
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Figure C.10 CATE Estimates (Reading) with School Fixed Effects
